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ABSTRACT
Neo-sentimentalism
and
The Bodily Attitudinal Theory of Emotions
by
Chan Chun Nam Emile
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Section 1 of this thesis investigates one issue in meta-ethics, namely, the nature of
moral judgments. What are moral judgments? What does it mean by "wrong" when we
assert "Killing is wrong?" Neo-sentimentalism is a meta-ethical theory which holds that the
judgment that killing wrong is the judgment that it is appropriate to have a particular
negative emotion towards the action. In other words, to judge that murder is wrong is to
judge that we have a right reason for having a negative emotion towards the behavior. In the
framework of neo-sentimentalism, the concepts of wrongness consist of negative emotions.
If the moral judgment is the judgment that it is appropriate to have a negative
emotion towards the action, and the concept of wrongness contains a neg ative emotion,
then the following question is what emotions are. In section 2, I endorse the bodily
attitudinal theory of emotions, a view which holds that a conscious physiological reaction
which induces behavior disposition and the change of facial expression and internal organs is
necessary for having an emotion. This section also articulates and replies to three major
objections towards the bodily attitudinal theory of emotion.
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0 Overview of the thesis
This thesis investigates an issue in meta-ethics, namely, the nature of moral
judgments. Before giving an answer to this issue, it would be better to explain what metaethics is. Fisher (2011, 11) mentions an analogy to distinguish between applied ethics,
normative ethics, and meta-ethics. Imagine that studying ethics is just like playing football.
In the game, there are three groups of people, including players, referees, and analysts.
Applied ethics are like players, who reflect that whether their actions violate the given rules.
They study in issues like if it is morally wrong to have an abortion and whether it is morally
required to give money to charity according to the given moral norms. Normative ethicists
are like referees, who interpret the rules that govern the game. They investigate on
questions like whether consequences matter to decide the moral status of having an
abortion or giving money to charity. Meta-ethics are like analysts, who attempt to
understand how the football game goes on. They explore questions like what it means by
“morally praiseworthy” and “morally blameworthy” and so forth, how to know what is right
and what is wrong, and how to be motivated to act morally.
As I have briefly distinguished between applied ethics, normative ethics, and metaethics, it is time to ask what the nature of moral judgments is. In this thesis, I attempt to
propose moral sentimentalism, briefly, a view which holds that emotions are necessary for
moral judgments. The sentimentalist theory possesses some advantages. For example, it
explains why moral judgments are motivating because emotions are motivating and
indispensable to moral judgments. Also, our daily experience tells us that most of the time
we will feel anger when we judge that one has acted morally wrong, or we will feel guilt
when we judge that we have done something immoral.
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Historically, David Hume was one of the pioneers who proposed moral sentimentalism,
a view that moral judgments depend on the feeling of sentient beings. As in his work An
Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, David Hume writes:
The final sentence, it is probable, which pronounces characters and actions amiable or
odious, praise-worthy or blameable; that which renders morality and active principle,
and constitutes virtue our happiness, and vice our misery; It is probable, I say, that this
final sentence depends on some internal sense of feeling, which nature has made
universal in the whole species. (Beauchamp ed., 1998, 5)
Such feeling of sentient beings is what Hume called sympathy which we refer to as empathy
nowadays (Slote, 2010, 5). Following Hume’s sprit, Slote develops a particular version of
moral sentimentalism. Slote (2010, 63; Watson, 2011 143) understands moral judgments as
moral approvals (or disapprovals) that are analyzed in terms of the feelings of being
warmed (or being chilled) by one’s empathy towards others’ pain or needs.
However, sometimes we still judge an action as morally wrong while being warmed by
one’s empathy towards another person (Watson, 2011, 143). It leads us to believe that it is
needed to have a less specific version of moral sentimentalism in order to avoid the
counter-example that Slote’s sentimentalism suffers from. A simpler version of moral
sentimentalism is proposed by Jesse Prinz. As he writes:
The theory I have in mind is not new. It’s a variant of an old theme, associated with
the British moralists, especially Hume. Simply, the theory says: To believe that
something is morally wrong (right) is to have a sentiment of disapprobation
(appropriation) towards it. (Prinz, 2006, 33)
Prinz’s sentimentalism is similar to D’Arms and Jacobson’s (2000, 724) sentimentalist
account which holds that “the judgment that an action X is wrong with disapproval of X
(and would similarly identify rightness with approval).”
Prinz’s theory takes negative sentiments in general, instead of empathy specifically,
as what are necessary to moral judgments, and thus avoid the counter-examples to Slote’s
sentimentalism. Yet such simple form of moral sentimentalism faces a direct objection,
2

namely, the problem of the recalcitrance of emotions. Sometimes we judge that an action
has a negative value without having a negative sentiment towards the action, or we have a
negative sentiment towards the action without judging the action as having the negative
value (D’arms and Jacobson, 2000, 725). It is needed to modify the simple form of moral
sentimentalism to overcome this objection.
The next question is how to modify the simple sentimentalism. By looking back to
what Hume writes, a glue can be found:
But in order to pave the way for such a sentiment, and give a proper discernment of
its object, it is often necessary, we find, that much reasoning should precede, that nice
distinctions be made, just conclusions drawn, distant comparisons formed,
complicated relations examined, and general facts fixed and ascertained. (Beauchamp
ed., 1998, 5)
As D’Arms and Jacobson (2000, 723) also suggest, “hence, philosophers who take
inspiration from Hume must allow reasoning, as well as feeling, to play a role in evaluative
judgment. The central challenge for sentimentalism is to preserve the idea that values are
somehow grounded in the sentiments, while at the same time making sense of the rational
aspects of evaluation.” On the basis of what Hume and D’Arms and Jacobson mention, it is
natural and legitimate to add reason into the sentimentalist framework to avoid the
problem that the simple sentimentalism suffers from.
Neo-sentimentalism is a theory that unifies emotions and reason, as Sauer writes:
To judge an action A to have some evaluative property P (goodness, badness,
rightness, wrongness…) is to judge it appropriate (warranted, justified…) to have an
associated emotional response (guilt, resentment, contempt…) towards A. (Sauer,
2011, 111)
It is said that to judge that an action is morally wrong is to judge that it is appropriate to
have a negative sentiment, such as anger, towards the action. But it does not mean that the
judgment of an appropriate emotion towards the action is actually accompanied by a
negative emotion. Otherwise, neo-sentimentalism cannot be immune to the problem of
3

recalcitrant of emotions. Because it is obvious that one can judge that it is appropriate to
have a negative emotion without having the emotions actually.
Nevertheless, once we understand moral judgments as the judgments of
appropriate emotions without actually having the emotions, what is the importance of
emotions? It seems that emotions no longer a play crucial in the picture. To preserve the
importance of emotions, I introduce the dual-process theory of mind. The theory holds that
the mind is divided into two systems, namely, system 1 and system 2. System1 is
responsible for automatic and instinctive processes that do not need to be consciously
accessed and are cognitively economical, whereas system 2 is responsible for rational and
deliberative processes that require conscious attentions and are cognitive-resources
demanding. I shall argue that emotions belong to system 1 and thus one makes moral
evaluations cognitively economical. In addition, emotions make one sensitive to the values
of the objects in environments and motivate one to act according to the moral judgment.
Without the help of emotions, one cannot be motivated to act morally.
Since emotions have such importance, I need to introduce a theory of emotions to
illustrate their significance. We need an account of emotions that illuminates how emotions
make one aware of the value of objects, able to make implicit moral evaluations, and
motivated to act morally. James’s theory of emotions was once influential. His theory holds
that the changes of the internal bodily feelings are emotions themselves. As James writes:
My thesis, on the contrary, is that the bodily changes follow directly the perception of
the exciting fact and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion.
James (1884, 189)
Nonetheless, understand emotions as what James suggests leads us to a serious flaw. Our
ordinary speaking of emotions demonstrates that emotions are intentional, which means
that emotions are directed at objects in the world. For instance, “Sam is sad for his cat, and
“Mary is angry at the man” and so forth. If emotions are merely the feelings of the internal
4

bodily changes, then James’s theory cannot explain the intentionality of emotions. And as
James’s theory cannot capture the intentionality, his theory cannot demonstrate how
emotions make one sensitive to the values of objects. The theory only makes one aware of
the feelings of one’s internal bodily changes.
The bodily attitudinal theory of emotions can be considered as a descendant of
James’s theory. Yet unlike its ascendant, the bodily attitudinal theory not only captures the
phenomenology but also the intentionality of emotions, as the following is its central thesis:
Each emotion consists in a specific felt bodily stance towards objects or situations,
which is correct or incorrect as a function of whether or not these objects and
situations exemplify the relevant evaluative property. (Deonna and Teroni, 2012, 89)
The bodily attitudinal theory of emotions holds that to have an emotion is to have a bodily
attitude towards the object. The bodily attitude is a consciously felt physiological response
to the object, which consists of “action readiness,” the feelings of the internal bodily
changes and other bodily phenomena. Action readiness is an idea proposed by the
psychologist Nico Frijda. The idea is that to have action readiness is to have the behavioral
tendency to perform a particular kind of behavior. To fear the dog is to have a bodily
attitude towards the dog and to have the attitude is to feel your body as poised to escape
from the dog, with the feelings of your internal bodily changes and other bodily
phenomena.
If we understand emotions as a consciously felt physiological response towards
objects, then we can illustrate the importance of emotions. Emotions make us sensitive to
the values of objects because of the bodily attitudes that are consciously felt. Emotions
motivate us to act morally because to have a bodily attitude is to feel our body as poised to
act in a certain way. And such behavioral dispositions are implicit evaluations of objects.
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Although the bodily attitudinal theory of emotions illustrates the importance of
emotions, the theory faces at least one serious difficulty. It is said that some patients who
suffer from severe spinal cord damage reported that they experience conscious emotions,
(Smith, 2014). It is supposed that the patients are unable to feel the feelings of their
internal bodily changes and perform the muscular movements since their brain is
disconnected or poorly connected to their body. Thus, it seems that bodily attitudes are not
necessary for emotions, which means that the bodily attitudinal theory encounters
counter-examples.
To protect the bodily attitudinal theory, my contribution is to introduce the idea of
“phantom emotions” to explain why those patients are still able to have consciously
emotions. My idea of phantom emotions is inspired by the occurrence of phantom limbs.
The majority of amputees reported that they felt their limbs even internal organs that had
been removed. They could vividly feel the shape, posture, and movement of their moved
limbs and organs. On the basis of the occurrence of phantom limbs, I attempt to use
phantom emotions, as a speculation, to explain why those patients can still experience
conscious emotions since bodily attitudes consist of action readi ness and other bodily
phenomena that could emerge as phantoms.

This thesis is divided into two sections. Section 1 investigates the nature of
moral judgments. In section 1.1 I shall mention empirical evidence that supports the
link between emotions and moral judgments. In section 1.2 I articulate different
versions of moral sentimentalism and propose neo-sentimentalism dialectically, in
order to provide a conceptual account that explains the nature of moral judgments
that emotions have a role within. Since according to neo-sentimentalism, moral
judgments are analyzed in terms of the judgments of an appropriate emotion, it is
needed to clarify the notion of appropriateness. In section 1.3 I shall propose three
6

prominent theories of reasons of the right kind as possible alternatives to clarify the
notion of being appropriate. The neo-sentimentalist understands moral judgments
as the judgments of an appropriate emotion without actually having the emotions,
which means that the significance of emotions seems largely weakened in the
picture. To preserve the importance of emotions, in section 1.4 I shall introduce the
dual-process theory to argue that emotions are a more cognitively economical way
to make moral evaluations.
To demonstrate other importance of emotions, namely, how emotions make
us sensitive to the value of objects and motivate us to act morally, in section 2 I
shall introduce the bodily attitudinal theory of emotions. Section 2.1 clarify the
central thesis of the bodily attitudinal theory of emotions and explain why we
should be in favor the bodily attitudinal theory of emotions rather than its rival, the
judgmental theory of emotions. Section 2.2 is a discussion about how to justify
emotions and value judgments. Section 2.3 explain the intentionality of emotions in
the framework of the bodily attitudinal theory by introducing the teleological
theory of representation. Section 2.4 considers and replies to possible objections to
the bodily attitudinal theory. And section 2.5 proposes a method to derived moral
emotions from non-moral emotions.
1 Moral Sentimentalism
Section 1 investigates moral sentimentalism. Briefly, moral sentimentalism is
a meta-ethics theory which holds that emotions are necessary to moral judgments.
This section is divided into four sub-sections. Section 1.1 explores empirical
evidence which supports the link between emotions and moral judgments. Section
7

1.2 articulate different versions of moral sentimentalism. Section 1.3 examines the
relation between the notion of appropriateness and reasons of the right kind.
Section 1.4 replies to objections to neo-sentimentalism once the idea of
appropriateness has been introduced into the theory.

1.1 Empirical Evidence for the Link Between Emotions and Moral Judgments
Before endorsing his version of moral sentimentalism, Prinz (2006, 30-33; 2007;
21-47) gather a fruitful amount of empirical evidence which supports the thesis that
emotions are related to moral judgments. Prinz understands the relation in terms of
the conjunction of three theses. The first thesis is that emotions co-occur with
moral judgments. The second thesis is that emotions affect moral judgment. And
the third thesis is that emotions are necessary for moral judgments.
1.1.1 Emotions Co-occur with Moral Judgments
Oliveira-Souza and Eslinger (2003, 301) provides the first piece of evidence
to support this thesis. While measuring the subjects’ brain activities, they invited
the subjects to evaluate moral sentence such as “you should break the law when
necessary” and non-moral sentence such as “stones are made of water.” To answer
both kinds of sentences, the subjects only answered “right” or “wrong.” The
emotional areas of the subject’s brain were active while evaluating moral sentences
whereas the areas were not active while evaluating non-moral judgments.
Sanfey et al. (2003, 1757) provide another piece of evidence to support this
thesis. Two subjects were asked to play the ultimate game, a game which involves
distributing monetary resources, Sanfey and his colleagues measured the subject's
8

brain activity during the play. While playing the game, one subject divided the
monetary sums with another player. If another player found that the distribution of
resources was unfair, the emotional areas of the player's brain would be activated.
Berthoz et al. (2002, 1698) collected the third piece of evidence to support
the thesis. Berthoz and the others mentioned a story to the subjects. The story is
that one dinner guest impolitely spat food back onto the plate after the first bite
and judge the food revolting. The emotions areas of the subject's brain were
activated, and the subject considered the behavior to be an inappropriate violation
of a norm.
1.1.2 Emotion Affect Moral Judgments
Prinz (2006, 31) mentions how other psychologists support the thesis that
emotions affect moral judgments. Schnall and the others found that if the subjects
had a more negative emotion, a more negative moral judgment would be made.
They mentioned the following scenario to the subjects:
Frank’s dog was killed by a car in front of his house. Frank had heard that in
China people occasionally eat dog meat, and he was curious what it tasted
like. So he cut up the body and cooked it and ate it for dinner. How wrong is
it for Frank to eat his dead dog for dinner? (Schnall et al., 2008, 16)
The subjects were asked to answer a questionnaire about the scenario and were
divided into two groups. The subjects in the first group gave their answers on a
clean and neat table which unlikely caused disgust, whereas the subjects in the
second group gave their answers on a nasty table with a dirty cup, a broken pencil,
used tissues, and a greasy pizza box which likely caused disgust. The subjects in the
second group judged the action as morally worse whereas the subjects in the first
9

group judged the action less morally wrong. Schnall and the others interpreted this
piece of evidence as suggesting that emotions affect moral judgments.
However, this interpretation of proof can be challenged. It might be the case
that the subjects' attentions were drawn to situations which possess relevant moral
properties, which means that the subject associated the scenario with other actions
or conditions which we deem morally questionable. It needs to establish that
negative emotions can solely make us have “negative moral judgments even when
we have no reason” for believing that the scenario does not possess moral
wrongness (Prinz, 2006, 31).
Wheatley and Haidt (2005, 780) found a piece of evidence to support the
needed proof. Wheatley, Haidt, and the others hypnotized subjects to make them
experience disgust suddenly when listening to the word "often." the subjects were
told stories which contain the word "often" and other synonymous. After being
hypnotized, the subjects felt disgusted when hearing the word "often" in the stories.
Interestingly, although some of the stories containing many tokens of the word
"often" described morally admirable characteristics, the subjects judged those traits
as morally condemnable. This piece of evidence leads to the conclusion that
negative emotions can solely cause us to have an adverse moral judgment even
when we would otherwise find nothing morally objectionable in the scenarios.
Besides, Murphy et.al. (2000, 18) invited subjects to evaluate the stories and
questions given in their experiments. One of the stories describes two siblings
having sexual intercourse. Björklund and the other asked the subjects to justify why
the sibling incest is morally unacceptable and denied the subject's justifications. For
10

example, the subjects claimed the behavior is morally wrong because they will give
birth to children with congenital defects, but Björklund and the others told the
subjects that birth control is applied. After the subjects' justification had been
challenged in this manner, the majority of the subjects still thought the action
immoral because it is disgusting, whereas only a handful of subjects changed their
minds about the moral status of incest (Prinz, 2006, 31). Assuming there are no
other possibilities, either reason or emotions affect moral judgments. If the subjects
still believed that sibling incest is morally problematic after their justifications had
been refuted, then it seems that emotions affect moral judgments.
1.1.3 Emotions Are Necessary for Moral Judgments
The claim that emotions are necessary for moral judgments is stronger than
the claim that emotions co-occur with moral judgments. The former suggests that
emotions are necessary to moral judgments, which means that emotions are
indispensable to moral judgments. Instead, the latter merely assets that emotions
and moral judgments emerge in the same situation at the same time. In this sense,
emotions may not be part of moral judgments.
The existence of psychopathy provides strong support to the thesis that
emotions are necessary for moral judgment (Prinz, 2006, 32). Psychopaths are those
who have significant difficulties with experiencing pain and negative emotions like
fear and sadness. It is also hard for psychopaths to identify facial expressions and
tones which are related to negative emotions (Blair et al., 2001, 491-492). In other
words, psychopaths are significantly incapable of feeling negative emotions in
themselves and detecting negative emotions in others. Because of this incapacity,
11

psychopaths keep committing morally unacceptable actions. Prinz (2006, 32)
believes that psychopaths act immorally because they are unable to have genuine
moral judgments, which means that psychopaths pretend that they understand
what "morally right" and "morally wrong" mean, but in fact, psychopaths cannot
comprehend moral concepts in the way emotionally healthy people do.
Blair (1995, 25) proposed that psychopaths are unable to differentiate
between ethical and conventional rules. If we give psychopaths a set of rules and
ask them which ones are moral and which ones are conventional, psychopaths likely
answer the questions incorrectly. Blair (1995, 11) provides a conjecture to explain
why psychopaths are unable to distinguish between moral and conventional rules.
The speculation is that psychopaths lack a violence-inhibition mechanism (VIM). In
other words, psychopaths have a psychological problem which makes them unable
to stop themselves from committing violence. The lack of VIM is explained by the
lack of moral emotions, and the inability to sense others’ negative emotions like
fear and sadness.
Nonetheless, Prinz (2007, 45) disagrees with that the VIM model can
satisfactorily explain psychopathy in the three following way. Firstly, psychopaths
also commit many morally condemnable actions such as lying and manipulating
which do not involve violence. Secondly, the VIM model cannot explain
psychopathy’s cognitive deficiency. For instance, psychopaths make numerous
mistakes while finishing mazes with increasing difficulties. Thirdly, the VIM model
does not explain why psychopaths lack non-moral negative emotions like fear and
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sadness besides the lack of moral emotions such as empathy. Another model is
needed to explain psychopathic behavior.
Prinz (2007, 46) believes that Gray’s Behavior Inhibition System (BIS) is more
capable of explaining psychopathic behavior since the core of the model is made of
non-moral negative emotions such as anxiety and grief and negative moral
emotions like empathic distress. The lack of the mechanism also brings psychopaths
the deficit with changing or ceasing their behavior.
1.1.4 Emotions, Moral judgments, and Motivational Internalism
If emotions are necessary for moral judgments, then motivational
internalism is sustained. The strong version of motivational internalism holds that
one’s genuine moral judgment brings one a dominant motivation to act accordingly.
To illustrate, if one judges that smoking is morally impermissible, then one is
overridingly motivated not to smoke even if the temptation to smoke is present.
Still, this version of motivational internalism is unreasonably strong because the
theory leaves no room for the weakness of will and inclinations against the moral
behavior. The weak version of motivational internalism holds that one’s sincere
ethical judgment brings one a defensible motivation to act accordingly, which
means the moral motivation can be overridden by conflicting desires or mental
illness (Rosati, 2014, section 3.2).
Prinz (2015, 70) mentions an argument for motivational internalism.
Although Prinz does not say which version of motivational internalism is supported
by his argument; I assume that Prinz endorses the weak version of motivational
internalism for the sake of being conservative. Prinz’s argument is that moral
13

judgments consist of emotional attitudes, and emotional attitudes are motivating.
Therefore, moral judgments are motivating. Prinz explicitly uses the phrase
“emotional attitudes” rather than “emotions” because emotions are directed at
objects and they are evaluations on objects. I shall clarify what attitudes mean in
section 2.
Since the premise that moral judgments contain emotions is sustained by
the empirical evidence mentioned in the previous sub-sections, I focus on justifying
the claim that emotions are motivating. Although our daily experience tells us that
emotions are motivating, the claim will be more fortified if empirical evidence is
brought to support it. McMillen and Austin (1971, 60) suggest that moral emotions
play a major role in promoting pro-social behavior. Evidence indicates that one who
feels guilty is more willing to perform compensational actions. For instance,
subjects who had cheated in an examination helped people for 62 minutes
averagely, while those who had not cheated in the test helped people merely for 2
minutes. Feeling guilty makes one bring compensation, and anticipating the feeling
makes one abler to resist future temptations. Furthermore, Prinz and Nichols (2010,
130) studied the psychological profile of anger. If a person has done a wrongdoing
to one, the one will feel angry at the person and are motivated to retaliate. Intense
anger would even motivate one to seek vengeance with a risk of paying a heavy
price. These studies suggest that emotions are motivating.
1.2 Different Versions of Moral Sentimentalism
The previous sub-section mentions how emotions are related to moral
judgments, and we have reasons for believing that moral judgment consists of
14

emotions. Then the following question is: Emotions are necessary to moral
judgments in what way? I shall discuss Slote’s and Prinz’s moral sentimentalism and
neo-sentimentalism below.
1.2.1 Slote’s Sentimentalism
To introduce and articulate the version of moral sentimentalism which I
endorse, I shall first describe Michael Slote’s moral sentimentalism because his
version is specific and one of the strongest accounts of moral sentimentalism. The
central thesis of Slote’s account is as follows:
(SS) An action is judged morally admirable (or morally condemnable) if and
only if the action manifests one’s agential empathy (or the lack of agential
empathy), and we feel warmed (or chilled) by one’s agential empathy (or the
lack of agential empathy). (Slote, 2010, 63; Watson, 2011, 143)
Moral judgments in (SS) consist of two layers. The first layer involves one’s agential
empathy towards another person. When one shows one’s agential empathy
towards another person, one shows an emotional response to the person’s pain or
needs. Clearly speaking, as Slote and Watson understand it, one’ agential empathy
is that one feels what another person feels:
I pointed out earlier: namely, that sort of “sympathy” Hume is talking about
is or involves what we nowadays usually refer to as empathy (rather than as
sympathy) the kind of phenomenon Bill Clinton was invoking or referring to
when he said, “I feel your pain.” (Slote, 2010, 30)
When I say I empathize, I do mean “empathize” and not “sympathize,” I feel
for her pain. I can vividly imagine what it would be like to be her… (Watson,
2011, 146)

15

The second layer is where moral approval (or disapproval) comes out. This moral
approval (or disapproval) is our empathy towards one’s agential empathy. We are
warmed if one demonstrates one’s agential empathy towards another person,
whereas we are chilled if one shows the lack of one’s agential empathy towards
another person. This empathetic warmth (or chill) is moral approval (or disapproval).
Watson (2011, 143) mentions a counter-example to (SS). Sometimes one
demonstrates one’s agential empathy towards another person, and we feel warmed
by one’s agential empathy, yet one’s judged as morally wrong. We have a reason for
rejecting (SS) if such counter-example exists:
The example I wish to develop, as a test case, is of a battered woman who
will not leave her husband, as is not uncommon. Imagine further that his
refusal to leave is not purely practical or strategic but is grounded in the
belief that he will change, that he does not really mean to harm her, that he
really loves her, and so forth. To add details to the case, suppose her
husband is a returning veteran, experiencing PTSD, and was a loving
husband prior to combat. Yet he cannot get his violent outbursts under
control. She feels conflicted and hopes that he will recover, but in the
meantime, she suffers abuse. We think she is in a horrible circumstance, and
it pains us to think of her plight. (Watson, 2011, 143)
We need to be aware of that in the above scenario there are two different tokens of
agential empathy. The first token is the wife’s empathy towards her husband which
causes her choose to stay with her husband. The second token is our agential
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empathy towards the wife as we think that she is a victim of such circumstance. The
first token is what we should concern here.
It seems that we that although the wife’s agential empathy towards her
husband make us feel warmed, we tend to think that the wife is taking a morally
wrong action because she chooses to stay with her husband. The right action would
be to leave her husband to guarantee her safety and help her husband while
keeping her distance.
To make sure that she treats (SS) fairly, Watson (2011, 144) think that we
need to think whether the moral judgment that it is morally wrong for the wife to
stay with her husband can be captured by (SS). Indeed, we are warmed by her
agential empathy towards his husband, but we judge that her choice is morally
wrong because she lacks agential empathy towards herself, and this lack chills us. If
self-directed agential empathy is possible, then (SS) can avoid this counter-example.
However, Slote explicitly states that self-care or self-directed action is not of our
moral concern, and Slote only mentions that agential empathy is other-directed:
Thus, empathy involves having the feelings of another (involuntarily)
aroused in ourselves, as when we see another person in pain. (Slote, 2010,
15)
If Slote does not mention that empathy is not self-directed, then the above counterexample cannot be explained away by (SS).
1.2.2 Prinz’s Sentimentalism
Prinz offers a less specific and strong account of moral s entimentalism. The
following is the central thesis of Prinz’s account:
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(PS) An action is judged morally wrong if and only if we have a negative
sentiment towards the action. (Prinz, 2006, 33)
Prinz has his use of the word “sentiment.” By “sentiment” Prinz means a disposition
to have certain kinds of emotions:
Sentiment of Approbation and disapprobation are, likewise, constituted by
different emotions on different occasions.” (Prinz, 2006, 34)
A disapprobation, in Prinz’s understanding, is a category which involves negative
emotions such as shame, guilt, anger, contempt, and disgust. If one deems what
another person has done immoral, then one has the disposition to have a negative
emotion, such as anger and disgust, towards another person’s action. If one deems
what one has done is morally condemnable, which means that one has the
disposition to feel guilty or ashamed. Nonetheless, for the sake of simplicity, I put
side the category issue and the words “sentiments” and “emotions”
interchangeably here.
Although (PS) can avoid the counter-example to (PS) because (PS) does not
take empathy as moral emotions in its framework, (PS) is still problematic since (PS)
faces its counter-examples as well. There are two kinds of counter-examples which
suggest that emotions are neither sufficient nor necessary to moral judgments. The
first kind is the recalcitrance of emotions and the second kind is the recalcitrance of
judgments.
The problem of the recalcitrance of emotions is used to attack the
judgmental theory of emotions, a view which holds that value judgments are
necessary to emotions. The problem is the judgmental theory preserves no room to
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permit emotions to conflict with the corresponding value judgments (D’Arms and
Jacabson, 2003, 129). This problem also bothers (PS). To have a recalcitrant emotion
is to have the emotion even one does not believe the corresponding value
judgment. The problem of the recalcitrance of judgments is that sometimes we
have a value judgment even if the relevant emotion does not exist.
Interestingly, Prinz himself mentions the instantiations of the recalcitrance
of emotions and judgments:
Imagine a mob hit man who is going through a process of reform. He may
not experience any sentiment of disapprobation towards killing, but he
nevertheless judges that killing is wrong. That suggests that sentiments are
not necessary. Or consider a person who was raised to think homosexuality
is wrong, but now rejects that view. She may still harbor irrepressible
negative sentiments when she thinks about homosexuality even though she
insists that homosexuality is morally acceptable. That suggests that
sentiments are not sufficient for moral judgments. (Prinz, 2007, 112)
Note that Prinz does not stand for a contradictory position because Prinz has held a
consistent stance through years according to his works (Prinz, 2006, 33; 2007, 94,
2015, 70). Prinz mentions the above counter-examples for demonstrating how he
could explain away the counter-examples by what he calls “second-order emotions.”
1.2.3 Neo-Sentimentalism
The counter-example to (PS) leads us to believe that we need to adopt a
more sophisticated version of moral sentimentalism, and neo-sentimentalism fits
our purposes. The following is the central thesis of the theory:
(NS) To judge an action A to have some evaluative property A (goodness,
badness, rightness, wrongness…) is to judge it appropriate (warranted,
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justified…) to have an associated emotional response (guilt, resentment,
contempt…) toward A. (Sauer, 2011, 111)
With the notion of appropriateness, (NS) can avoid the counter-examples to (PS).
Prinz (2007, 114) illustrates how the idea of appropriateness can explain away the
above counter-examples. Although the mob hit man experiences no negative
emotion towards killing, he judges that killing is wrong because he deems feeling
guilty for killing appropriate. Although the person experiences an irrepressible
negative emotion towards homosexuality, she maintains that the judgment that
being homosexual is morally permissible because she deems having a negative
sentiment towards this sexual orientation inappropriate.
(NS) is immune to the counter-examples to (PS) because if it is appropriate
to have a negative emotion towards killing, it means that we have a right reason for
having the negative emotion, and the same reason is also for having the
corresponding moral judgment. In other words, the concept of appropriateness
prevents the recalcitrance of emotions and judgments by unifying emotions and
moral judgment.
Prinz (2007, 113) attempts to analyze the notion of appropriateness as
second-order emotions. A second order emotion is an emotion which is directed at
a first-order emotion, an emotion directed at an object. The mob hit man deems
having a negative emotion towards killing appropriate because he has a secondorder negative emotion towards not having a negative emotion towards killing. The
person deems having a negative emotion towards homosexuality inappropriate
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because she has a second-order negative emotion towards having a negative
emotion towards being homosexual.
Nonetheless, I disagree with that the notion of appropriateness can be
analyzed in terms of second-order emotions. Firstly, it is unclear that all first-order
emotions are accompanied by second-order emotions. Is my admiration towards
the Mother Teresa’s sacrifice accompanied by a second-order emotion? Secondly,
assuming that second-order emotions accompany all first-order emotions, but what
make second-order emotions appropriate? Third-order emotions? It seems that
Prinz’s analysis leads to an infinite regress. Perhaps some might say that it is not
required to deem second-order emotions appropriate or inappropriate. Buy why
not? Is it because second-order emotions are different from first-order emotions?
But what is the difference? If first-order emotions need to be deemed appropriate
or inappropriate, and there is no difference between first-order and second-order
emotions, then it is unclear why it is not mandatory to deem second-order
emotions appropriate or inappropriate as well. There are three other prominent
ways of explaining the notion of appropriateness.
Furthermore, to judge that killing is morally wrong is to judge that it is
appropriate to have a negative emotion towards killing, but we should not
understand that the judgment of the appropriate emotion is always accompanied
by an actual emotion. It is simply the judgment that it is appropriate to have the
negative emotion. If the judgment of the appropriate emotion required an actual
emotion, then neo-sentimentalism would suffer from the problem of the
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recalcitrance of emotions as well, since it is possible that one judge that it is
appropriate to resent killing without actually experiencing the anger towards killing.
1.3 Appropriateness and Reasons of the Right Kind
To be appropriate to have a negative emotion is to have a right reason for
having the emotion. Based on the textual evidence, some scholars such Schroeder
and Sauer, identify the notion of appropriateness with reasons of the right kind.
“This is because the point of the distinction between the “right” and “wrong” kinds
of reason, is that only the “right” kind contributes to standards of correctness…,”
Schroeder (2008, 13) writes. Sauer (2011, 115) repeatedly treat the notion of
appropriateness the reasons of the right kind interchangeably. These pieces of
textual evidence support that the concepts of appropriateness refer to reasons of
the right kind.
1.3.1 Scanlon’s Buck-Passing Account of Value
According to (NS), to judge that an action is wrong is to judge that it is
appropriate to have a negative emotion towards the action, and this thesis is
parallel to Scanlon’s account:
(BPV) The alternative, which I believe to be correct, is to hold that being
good, or valuable, is not a property that itself provides a reason to respond
to a thing in certain ways. Rather, to be good or valuable is to have other
properties that constitute such reasons. (Scanlon, 1998, 97)
(BPV) holds that for an object to be valuable is not that the feature of being
valuable “gives us a reason to respond to the object in a certain way” (Scanlon,
1998, 97), but is that the properties other than the property of being valuable to
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give us a reason to show a particular response towards to the object. (Samuelsson,
2013, 1).
Since the role of giving us a reason for responding to the object in a certain
way is passed to the properties other than the property of being valuable, the
account is called a “buck-passing account” (Scanlon, 1998, 97). Applying (BPV) to
(NS) amounts to saying that for an action to be morally wrong, is not a matter of the
property of being morally wrong giving us a reason for responding to the behavior
in a certain way. Instead, it is to say that the properties other the property of being
morally wrong to give us a reason for having a particular negative emotional
response towards the action.

1.3.2 Wrong Kinds of Reason Problem
Scanlon’s account leads to wrong kinds of reason problem (WKRP). This
issue holds that sometimes we have a reason for responding to an object in a
certain way, yet the object itself lacks the corresponding value (or properties that
constitute the value) (Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, 2004, 393; Samuelsson,
2013, 1). Rabinowicz and Rønnow (2004, 402) vividly illustrate this problem by
inviting us to imagine that “a powerful demon threatens to impose severe pain on
us uncles we admire the devil.” This threat seems to give us a strong reason for
praising the mighty fiend, yet we tend not to think that the demon is admirable (or
has properties that constitute the properties of being admirable). However,
according to (BPV), the demon’s intention to impose severe pain on us is a property
other than the property of being admirable gives us a reason for admiring the
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demon. It leads us to believe that this reason for admiring the demon is a wrong
reason, and thus, we need to exclude wrong reasons from right reasons
(Samuelsson, 2013, 2).
Since the structure of (NS) is parallel to the framework (BPV), (NS) would
suffer from the same problem if (WKRP) were not solved. I shall mention three
prominent theories of reasons of the right kind which are alternatives to deal with
(WKRP).
1.3.3 Lang and Samuelsson’s Account of Reasons of the Right Kind
Lang proposes a theory of reasons of the right kind, and Lang’s account is
challenged by Olson’s objection, then Samuelsson replies to Olson’s criticism, which
means that the account is co-developed by Lang and Samuelsson. Lang has modified
(BPV) six times and the following is the central of the Lang’s theory:
(BPV6) An object is valuable if and only if the object has properties other
than the property of being valuable that give us a reason to show a certain
attitude towards the object, as long as those properties would still be
reason-giving in the absence of the benefits to us of showing the certain
attitude towards the object. (Lang, 2008, 484)
(BPV6) seems able to exclude the demon’s threat from reasons of the right kind,
because the threat as a property other than the property of being admirable, would
not longer be reason-giving to us if the demon stopped threatening to punish us. In
other words, if the demon does not force us to admire him, then we no longer have
a reason for admiring the demon. A reason of the right kind must not be such a
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prudential reason. Nonetheless, (BPV6) is further attacked by Olson’s counterexample:
Suppose for instance that an evil demon threatens to inflict severe pain on
people on the other side of Earth, who are all strangers to us, unless we
favour him. That seems to provide reason for us to favour the demon even
though we would not benefit from favouring him. (Olson, 2009, 226)
Another wrong reason for admiring the devil comes into the picture. This counterexample is about the advantages of ours but of others. If the demon threatens to
impose severe pain on people who we have never met, we seem to have a reason
for admiring the devil, yet the demon still does not deserve being admired. To avoid
the further counter-example and the other possible variations of the example,
Samuelsson modifies (BPV6) in the following way:
(BPV11) An object is valuable if and only if the object has properties other
than the property of being valuable that give us a reason to show a certain
attitude towards the object, as long as those properties would still be
reason-giving in the absence of any consequences of showing the certain
attitude towards the object. (Samuelsson, 2013, 7)
According to (BPV11), no matter what the demon would do to anyone, we would
not have a right reason for admiring the devil, because any consequence that the
devil would bring are not of our concern. (BPV11) is further objected because of its
incompatibility with consequentialism, but I shall not discuss this criticism here.
1.3.4 Schroeder’s Account of Reasons of the Right Kind
Before introducing his account of reasons of the right kind in his article,
Schroeder distinguishes two kinds of wrong reasons. The first kind of wrong reasons
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is that one engages in an activity for extra benefits. For instance, John admires the
mighty devil for avoiding his punishment, or Jack believes the judgment that Mars is
green for a huge amount of incentives. John and Jack’s reasons are reasons for
some people to engage in activities, but those reasons are not reasons for anyone
to do something (Schroeder, 2008, 11).
Schroeder (2008, 12) illustrate the first kind of wrong reasons with the
following example: if your son is being brought to court for murder, and you would
experience a great torment if you believe that your son was guilty. Then you have a
reason for refusing to accept the belief that your son is guilty, yet your reason is not
anyone’s reason for believing that your son is not guilty.
Schroeder (2008, 12) also mentions another example from Gregory Kavka. If
a billionaire promises that he will give you a huge amount of incentives in exchange
fro your intention to drink the poison before tomorrow, then you have a reason for
intending to drink the position now, but this reason is only available at a particular
time but not any time. The similarity shared by all of this two kinds of wrong
reasons is that being idiosyncratic. By idiosyncratic, it means that these reasons are
only valid for particular people who engage in certain activities. And the meaning of
activities refers to any mental and physical actions in a broad sense.
The second kind of wrong reasons is that we sometimes conflate a kind of
reasons with another kind. Schroeder believes that good instances of the second
kind of wrong reasons are moral reasons. Imagine that someone makes a cruel but
amusing joke at a gathering. We have a reason for not laughing at the joke because
it is immoral to do so, but this moral reason does not make the joke less assuming
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(D’Arm and Jacobson, 2000, 731). Moral reasons are universal in the way that the
reasons are valid to anyone, whereas the idiosyncratic reasons are only valid to a
particular kind of people who engage in a certain kind of activities.
After illustrating the characteristics of wrong reasons, Schroeder introduces
an account to exclude such reasons. The following is the central thesis of
Schroeder’s theory:
(SRKR) If a reason belongs to the right kind of reasons for engaging in an
activity A if and only if the reason is shared necessarily by anyone who
engages in A, and just because engaging in A (Schroeder, 2008, 13).
The “shared necessarily by anyone engages in A” part is important to differentiate
the first kind of wrong reasons from right reasons, because the part is meant to
exclude idiosyncratic reasons. If a reason is a right reason for engaging in an activity,
then the reason is shared necessarily by anyone who engages in the activity and
vice versa. The reason that the dog has properties that constitute fearsomeness is a
right reason for fearing the dog because the reason is shared by necessarily who
fears the dog. To illustrate, the dog performs an aggressive and impulsive behavior
and has big claws and sharp teeth that are extremely likely to bring colossal even
lethal damage to one’s physical integrity. These features make any who has
interactions with the dog believe that their physical integrity would be heavily
damaged, or even their lives would be terminated if attacked by the dog. Thus, the
features would constitute fearsomeness and are the reason for fearing dog that is
shared by any who has interactions with the dog (if they are made of flesh and
blood). Instead, the reason that a billionaire promises that he will give you a million
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dollars if you fear the dog is not a right reason since the reason is not shared by
necessarily who fears the dog. Some people simply are not interes ted in money or
any benefits.
The “just because engaging in A” part is also crucial to differentiate the
second kind of wrong reasons from right reasons because the part is meant to
exclude universal reasons that can be applied to other activities. If a reason is a
right reason for engaging in an activity, then the reason can only be applied the
activity, and vice versa. The reason that the dog has properties that constitute
fearsomeness is a reason for fearing the dog because this reason cannot be applied
to other activities. On the contrary, a moral reason, say, God’s command is not a
right reason for fearing the dog because God’s command can be applied to other
activities.
1.3.5 Hieronymi’s Account of Reasons of the Right Kind
According to Hieronymi (2005, 448; Birondo, 2014, 128), (WKRP) arises from
our traditional understanding of reasons. Traditionally, we think that to have a
reason is to have a consideration for an activity. The understanding conflates wrong
reasons with right reason. If the demon threatens to impose severe pain on us
unless we admire the demon, then we have a reason for admiring the devil, which
means that we have a consideration for admiring the demon. Also, assume that the
demon is in fact admirable (or has properties that constitute the property of being
admirable), then we have another reason for admiring the demon, which means
that we have another consideration for admiring the demon. Based on the
traditional understanding of reasons, both reasons are also considerations for
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admiring the demon, yet we have no resource for differentiating between these
reasons which belong to different categories.
Therefore, Hieronymi suggests that we should abandon the traditional
understanding and adopt her alternative:
(HRKR) to have a right reason for engaging in an activity is to have a
consideration which bears on the relevant question.
If the demon threatens to impose severe pain on us unless we admire the demon,
then we have a reason for admiring the demon, which means that we have a
consideration which bears on the prudential question whether it is beneficial to
admire the demon. Assume that the demon is admirable (or has properties that
constitute the property of being admirable), then we have a consideration for
admiring the demon which bears on the emotional question whether the demon is
admirable (or has properties that constitute the property of being admirable). For
example, assume that the demon is totally selfless, solidly courageous and
extraordinarily determined. These features make us believe the demon as a rolemodel on many different aspects, and thus the features give us a consideration for
admiring the demon. Based on Hieronymi’s understanding of reasons, now we have
resources for differentiating between distinct kinds of considerations.
1.3.6 Plausibility of the Accounts of Right Kinds of Reasons
After clarifying the three theories of reasons of the right kind, I need to explain why
these candidates are equally plausible. Here is my argument:
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(1) If a theory of reasons of the right kind can differentiate between emotional
appropriateness and prudential appropriateness, then the theory fulfills one
of the necessary conditions for being a plausible theory of reasons of the
right kind.
(2) Hieronymi, Schroeder, and Lang and Samuelsson’s theories can distinguish
between these different kinds of appropriateness.
Thus,
(3) Hieronymi, Schroeder, and Lang and Samuelsson’s accounts fulfill one of the
necessary conditions for being a plausible theory of reasons of the right kind.
Premise (1) is needed because of the conflation problem. This issue is that one type
of appropriateness can be conflated other types of appropriateness (Sauer, 2011,
112).
The following example illustrates how emotional appropriateness can be conflated
with moral appropriateness:
John the Great is an ambitious dedicatory king who has a singular, personal
and unshakable determination, namely, conquering the world with his
massive army formed by huge groups of innocent civilians.
It is appropriate to admire his singular unshakable determination because it is
admirable (or has properties that constitute the property of being admirable). But it
is appropriate not to admire his determination because such a determination is
selfish as he decides to achieve his personal goal by sacrificing many innocent
people.
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D’Arms and Jacobson also illustrate how emotional appropriateness can be
conflated with prudential appropriateness:
“Imagine that you have a rich and generous but touchy friend, who is
extremely sensitive about his friends’ attitude toward his wealth. If he
suspects you of envying his possessions, he will curtail his largesse. That is a
good reason not to envy him, […] but surely it doesn’t speak to whether his
possessions are enviable. (D’Arms and Jacobson, 2000, 731)
Neo-sentimentalism holds that to judge an object has a particular value is to judge
that it is appropriate to have a certain emotion towards the object, but neosentimentalism needs extra resources to differentiate between distinct kinds of
appropriateness, and theories of right kinds of reasons play a role in identifying
distinct types of appropriateness. Furthermore, Deonna and Teroni (2012, 7)
suggest that it is needed to distinguish between emotional appropriateness and
other types of appropriateness such as prudential appropriateness.
Lang and Samuelsson’s theory can distinguish between emotional
appropriateness and prudential appropriateness. Their theory holds that your
friend’s wealth is enviable if and only if the wealth has properties other than its
property of being enviable that give us a reason to envy the wealth, as long as the
properties would still give us a reason to envy the wealth in the absence of any
consequences of envying the wealth. Taking benefits from your rich friend is a
consequence of not envying the wealth, thus, this talking is not a right reason for
not envying the wealth.
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Schroeder’s theory can distinguish between emotional appropriateness and
prudential appropriateness because of the criterion “the reason is shared
necessarily by anyone who engages in A” in (SRKR). Taking benefits from your rich
friend is not a right reason for not envying the wealth since this reason is not shared
necessarily by anyone who engages in not envying the wealth. Some people are just
not interested in taking benefits from your friend.
Hieronymi’s account can distinguish between emotional appropriateness
and prudential appropriateness. If your friend’s wealth is enviable (or has properties
that constitute the property of being enviable), then you have a reason for envying
the wealth, and this reason bears on the question whether your friend’s property is
enviable (or has properties that constitute the property of being enviable). If your
friend would give you fewer benefits if you envy your friend’s wealth, then you have
a reason for not envying the wealth, and this reason is a consideration which bears
on the question whether it would be beneficial to envy your friend’s wealth. The
first consideration bears on an emotional question, whereas the second
consideration bears on a prudential question, and thus we can distinguish between
emotional appropriateness and prudential appropriateness in this case.
It is worth saying that theories of right kinds of reasons can make a
distinction between emotional appropriates, prudential appropriateness, but neosentimentalists do not have to differentiate between emotional appropriateness
and moral appropriateness here. If we endorse neo-sentimentalism, then to judge
that it is immoral to take an action is to judge that it is appropriate to have a

32

negative emotion towards the behavior. In other words, the neo-sentimentalist
reduces moral appropriateness to emotional appropriateness.
1.4 Objections towards Neo-Sentimentalism
Although the notion of appropriateness helps neo-sentimentalism avoids
the problem of the recalcitrance of emotions and judgments, the theory apparently
faces at least two objections because introducing the concept of appropriateness
seems to entails that emotions are no longer important in this picture. It is
apparently the case that reason alone is sufficient to provide one moral knowledge
and motivate one to act morally. To defend the importance of emotions in the
framework of neo-sentimentalism, I shall articulate and reply to two possible
objections. Emotions have three different kinds of importance. The first kind is that
emotions are a more cognitive-economical way to make moral evaluations. The
second kind is that emotions make us sensitive to the values of the objects in
environments. The third kind is that emotions motivate us to act morally. I shall
articulate the first kind of importance in section 1.4, and clarify the other kinds of
importance section 2.
1.4.1 An Epistemic Objection and Reply
If we accept neo-sentimentalism, then to judge that an action is morally
wrong is to judge that it is appropriate to have a negative emotion towards the
behavior, without actually having an emotion. To be appropriate to have a negative
emotion is to have a right reason (in either Lang’s, Schroeder’s, or Hieromyni’s
senses) for having the emotion. A natural objection is that the right reason for
having the emotion would also say what non-moral properties would constitute
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moral properties. In other words, it is another way which bypasses emotions to gain
moral knowledge. It leads us to believe that it is epistemically superfluous to gain
moral knowledge via emotions.
I do not deny that reason can bypass emotion to make moral judgments, but
I attempt to claim that emotions are a more efficient way to make moral
evaluations. Such moral evaluations are implicit, which means that evaluations are
manifested via something other than judgments, such as consciously felt
physiological reactions towards objects. (I shall explain the meaning of evaluations
as consciously felt physiological reactions in section 2). In psychology, the dualprocess theory, a view which holds that mind is divided into two systems is widely
accepted. System 1 involves automatic heuristic-based responses, and is fast,
cognitively economical, and relatively narrow in scope, whereas system 2 involves
conscious deliberation, and is slow, cognitively resource-demanding, but more
flexible (Holton, 2009, 54). Spripada (2010, 795) suggests that system 1 includes
“simply associative operations, and has access to limited information, whereas
system 2 includes linguistic or logical representations, and has access to larger and
more global stores of information.” And Levy (2010, 145) claims that system 1 is
undemanding of cognitive resources whereas system 2 is demanding of them. The
fewer cognitive resources one has, the more difficult it is for one to function under
system 2; the resources are depleted only if one is unavoidably switched to system
2. It is suggested that cognitive resources are related to glucose since the operation
of the brain requires a tremendous amount of blood sugar, and the processes of the
functions of system 2 burn glucose quickly (American Psychological Association,
2012).
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Also, Greene (2007, 322) developed a dual-process theory of moral
judgments. The dual process theory holds that there are two different ways to do
moral reasoning in the brain. The first way is to make automatic and imminent
reactions to actions that violate morality. These reactions are implicit and one might
not consciously get access to the causes of the reactions. Greene believes that the
automatic and imminent reactions are activated by the emotional areas in the brain.
The second way is to do conscious and deliberative moral reasoning. Such reasoning
is different from the emotional responses to the violation of morality. The reasoning
is instead utilitarian: it focuses on how to maximize the benefits and minimalize the
losses in the overall picture. Furthermore, Greene states that people who suffer
from the damage in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), a part which is
related to the activation of emotions in the brain, tend to make utilitarian reasoning
and decisions. Greene’s theory matches the descriptions of system 1 and system 2
given by the philosophers mentioned above, saying that human beings have two
ways to make moral evaluations.
If I attempt to introduce Greene's theory to my picture, then I need to solve
a puzzle: If psychopaths do not concern the well-being of others because of the lack
of moral emotions like empathy, then why psychopaths would make utilitarian
moral decisions, which would not only benefit their own interests but also others'?
Koenigs et al. (2011) studied in a comparison between psychopaths and nonpsychopaths. They further divided the group of psychopaths into the group of
psychopaths with a high level of anxiety and the group of psychopaths with a low
level of anxiety. They invited the subjects to make moral judgments in hypothetical
scenarios with moral dilemmas. The moral dilemmas describe “personal” and
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“impersonal” actions. By “personal” it means actions that directly involve physical
harms (such as “pushing one person off a bridge to stop a runaway train car from
hitting five people”), whereas by “impersonal” it refers to actions that indirectly
involve harms or cause harm remotely (like “pulling a switch to divert a runaway
train car from hitting five people”). Both groups of psychopaths preferred taking
impersonal actions. Yet only psychopaths with a low level of anxiety were in favor of
executing personal harms if the harm would maximize the welfare of the overall
individual.
To answer this question, it seems that Blair's speculation provides us a clue.
Blair (1997) claims that psychopaths are unable to distinguish moral rules from
conventional rules, yet they tend to treats both kinds of rules as inviolable as moral
rules. Blair speculates that psychopaths attempt to persuade people that they are
morally healthy. This founding suggests that psychopaths are dishonest and even
cunning. Based on the deviousness of psychopaths, I am tempted to say that they
express utilitarian moral reasoning and decisions because they realize that making
and expressing utilitarian moral decisions can maximize their own interests. Instead,
if they make and express decisions that only concern their own interests explicitly,
then people would avoid having interactions with them, and thus they cannot
maximize their own benefits because being unwelcome in society. After briefly
presenting the dual-process theories and ego depletion, I argue as follows:
(4) Making moral evaluations via emotions is a process under system 1.
(5) Making moral evaluations via reason is a process under system 2.
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(6) Processes under system 1 are more cognitively economical than processes
understand system 2.
Thus,
(7) Making moral evaluations via emotions is more cognitively economical than
making moral evaluations via reason. (From (4) to (6).)
Premise (4) is supported by evidence about decision-making and emotions. Bechara
et al. (2000, 297) invented “the gambling game” and invited subjects to play this
game to investigate the emotional influences on decision-making. The game
simulates real-life situations which include uncertainty, rewards, and punishments,
and the goal of the game is to get benefits based on the loaned money. The game
had 100 rounds (the subjects were not told about this) and there were four tables
named as A, B, C, and D. In each round they were allowed to select only one card
from only one of the tables and were allowed to move to another table at any
moment as they wanted. The game was followed by a series of rewards and
punishments which were only known to the examiners. If subjects took a card from
table A or B, they would gain $100 whereas if they took a card from table C or D,
they would only gain $50. Nevertheless, the punishments which were unknown to
the subjects were meted out more on table A and B than table C and D. Every 10
rounds, the subjects would lose $1250 on tables A and B, where they would lose
only $250 on tables C and D. Measuring in long-term, table A and B were more
disadvantaged because the subjects would lose $250 from table A and B in every 10
rounds whereas they would gain $250 on table C and D.
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After the tenth round, the subjects were asked whether they had an idea of
how the game operated. Meanwhile, their skin conductance responses (SCRs),
which indicate emotional responses, were measured. In the first ten rounds, the
subjects had mainly chosen the cards on table A and B, and thus they suffered their
first losses. After the fiftieth round, the subjects started to choose cards from table
C and D more frequently, and their anticipatory SCRs were activated stronger right
at the moment before choosing card from table A and B than table C and D.
Interestingly, at this stage the subjects reported that they had no idea of what was
happening. After the eightieth round, Bechara, and the others claim that the subject
has a “hunch” about what was happening and began to mainly choose a card from
table C and D. The subjects reported that they liked tables C and D and guessed that
the tables were more rewarding than tables A and B without certainty.
Here is another story which is similar to the card game. A firefighter felt that
the situation was not right without knowing what was going on exactly:
It is a simple house ﬁre in a one-storey house in a residential neighborhood.
The ﬁre is in the back, in the kitchen area. The lieutenant leads his hose crew
into the building, to the back, to spray water on the ﬁre, but the ﬁre just
roars back at them. ‘‘Odd,’’ he thinks. The water should have more of an
impact. They try dousing it again, and get the same results. They retreat a
few steps to regroup. Then the lieutenant starts to feel as if something is not
right. He doesn’t have any clues; he just doesn’t feel right about being in
that house, so he orders his men out of the building—a perfectly standard
building with nothing out of the ordinary. As soon as his men leave the
building, the ﬂoor where they had been standing collapses. Had they still
been inside, they would have been plunged into the ﬁre below. (Klein, 1998,
32)
In the card game, it seems that the subject did not deliberate because they
reported that they did not know what was happening in detail, and they claimed
that they like tables C and D and that they guess tables C and D were safer.
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Moreover, they naturally changed their behavior, moving to tables C and D from
tables A and B. In the firefighting case, the lieutenant made the decision to leave
the building based on his emotional response which indicated the heat of the fire
and the lack of noise which was relative to the fire, but the lieutenant had not been
aware of what spurred his feeling until Klein and his colleagues gave him their
analysis (Holton, 2009, 63). These likings, guessings, and feelings fit the descriptions
of system 1, and thus we have a reason to believe that these and similar emotional
processes are governed by that sort of cognitive system.
Premise (5) is obviously true since it fits our daily experience. If we have
finished our dinner and are about to pay the bill equally, dividing the total amount
of the bill requires deliberative mathematical processes, no matter how simple the
calculation is. Also, we have a good reason to believe that logical operations are
under system 2 because rational calculation and making choices are ego depleting
(Levy, 2010, 145).
Premise (6) is clarified by the notion of ego depletion. If making moral
evaluations by emotions is a process under system 1, then making moral
evaluations in this way does not require many cognitive resources. Instead, if one
makes moral evaluations under system 2, then one makes moral evaluations in a
cognitively resources-demanding way. Practically speaking, if both ways are
channels to moral evaluations, and making moral evaluations is more economical
under system 1, then it is unclear why making moral evaluations via emotion is not
a preferred choice, although we can make moral evaluations by reason as well.
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It needs to be mentioned that emotions and reason are equally reliable in
terms of generating moral evaluations. Reliabilism for justification holds that a
belief is justified if and only if the belief is produced by a reliable belief-making
process (Becker, n.d., introduction). The examples of the reliable belief-making
process include perception, solid memory, calculating, whereas guessing, wishful
thinking are the examples of unreliable processes. The former kind of belief-making
processes is reliable because they tend to produce true belief whereas the latter
kind tends to produce false belief. We can also apply reliabilism to emotions. if an
emotion is produced by a reliable emotion-making process, then the emotiongenerated moral evaluations are equally justified as the judgments deriving from
the operation of system 2 since reliably generated emotions are likely to be correct
and thus the correspondent moral judgments are likely to be true.
It needs to explain why emotion-generated evaluations and the judgment
driving from the operation of system 2 are equally justified. Both emotions and
value judgments are mind-to-world, which means that they represent something
outside the external world. To allow one’s emotions and judgments to represent
something, there must be reliable emotion/judgment-making processes as proper
channels between one and the external world which are shared by both kinds of
mental states. If I see John and hear the sounds of his footsteps, then my belief that
John is there is justified since the belief is formed via my visual and audio
perceptions that are proper connections to the external world. If I see the big claws
and sharp teeth of the dog and hear that the dog is barking at me, then my fear of
the dog is justified as well because the emotion is formed via the proper channels.
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In section 2 I shall propose a more sophisticated version of reliabilism called agent
reliabilism.
1.4.2 A Motivational Objection and Reply
Suppose that some workers are unavoidably working right outside your
office in the department of philosophy. You are annoyed by the noise they make,
and it seems that you have a right reason to feel annoyed because the properties of
the noise would constitute the property of being annoying. However, at this
moment, you suppress your emotion because you judge that the workers are just
doing their job, and you ought not to show your ire towards people who are just
doing their jobs unavoidably outside your office. This “ought” seems to give you
some motivating force not to unleash your ire, which means that there is another
source other than emotions, perhaps reason, to motivate you.
Although I disagree with that Prinz’s understanding of the notion of
appropriateness, we can explain the statement that there is another source other
than emotions to provide motivation. The “ought” in the scenario can be
understood as a second-order emotion. It is true that you feel annoyed by the noise
brought by the worker, but you are motivated not to unleash the feeling of being
annoyed because you have another negative emotion towards your emotion of
being annoyed. Such second emotion can explain away the appearance of another
source of motivation. Please note that I do not adopt Prinz’s understanding entirely
because the appropriateness of emotions should be analyzed in terms of reasons of
the right kind.
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Even if I cannot deny that there is a source other than emotions which
provide us moral motivation to act, the motivational importance of emotion can still
be preserved in a weaker sense. If one suffers from ego depletion, then one’s
reason cannot function effectively and efficiently, which means it is difficult for
one’s reason to deliberate and motivate one to act morally. But if one encounters
ego depletion, one will be switched to system 1 even one is not willing to.
Emotional processes are processes under system 1, which means that one can still
be morally motivated by emotion in the condition of ego depletion. Moreover,
system 1 is activated most of the time in one’s daily life, whereas one only engages
in system 2 and thus are motivated by reason occasionally. Emotions play the
motivational role mainly in time.
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2 The Bodily Attitudinal Theory of Emotions
In order to preserve the importance of emotions after introducing neosentimentalism, I suggest that there are three kinds of importance. The first kind is
that emotions are a more cognitive-economical way to make moral evaluations. The
second kind is that emotions make one sensitive to the values of the objects in
environments. And the third kind is that emotions motivate one to act morally. I
have articulated the first kind in section 1.4, and I shall explain the second and third
kinds in this section.
In the previous section, I described neo-sentimentalism, a theory which
holds that to judge that it is morally wrong to perform an action is to judge that it is
appropriate to have a particular kind of negative emotion towards the action. These
negative emotions include at least contempt, anger, and disgust.
According to Rozin et al. (1999, 576; Prinz and Nichols, 2010, 122), there are
three different kinds of norms that correspond to these negative emotions, and
which exist across many different cultures. These are community norms, autonomy
norms, and divinity norms. Community norms are about public goods and social
hierarchies. Autonomy norms prohibit harms against people. Divinity norms in nonsecular societies forbid crimes against gods, whereas in secular societies forbid
crimes against nature. The violation of community norms causes contempt, the
violation of the autonomy norms brings anger, and the violation of the divinity
norms spurs disgust. This model is called “the CAD model” (contempt, anger,
disgust). I will use this model in my thesis.
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I have analyzed moral judgments in terms of judgments of appropriate
emotional responses, and the notion of appropriateness is further analyzed in terms
of the right kinds of reasons for the attitude. What is still needed is a theory of the
emotions. I will argue that Deonna and Teroni’s bodily attitudinal theory of
emotions provides us with an explanation of how moral judgments are motivating,
and it can be used to give an explanation of how emotions and value judgments can
be justified. Combining the bodily attitudinal theory with neo-sentimentalism, we
can explain how moral judgments can be warranted.
2.1 The Central Thesis of the Bodily Attitudinal Theory of Emotions
The central thesis of the bodily attitudinal theory of emotions is as follows:
Each emotion consists in a specific felt bodily stance towards objects or
situations, which is correct or incorrect as a function of whether or not these
objects and situations exemplify the relevant evaluative property. (Deonna
and Teroni, 2012, 89)
While having an emotion, we experience a consciously felt physiological reaction
towards an object. A consciously felt physiological response could make sense or
not. It makes sense to have the physiological response if the object that the
physiological reaction is directed at possesses the relevant value; otherwise, it does
not make sense. According to Smith (2014, 98), the bodily attitudinal theory is
composed of the following two claims: the first claim is that conscious physiological
reactions are necessary emotions. The second claim is that to have an emotional
attitude (a consciously felt physiological response) towards an object is to evaluate
the object, in the sense that values determine whether it makes sense to have the
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attitude towards the object. I shall explain each of these claims in more detail in the
following sections.
2.1.1. Emotions as Felt Bodily Attitudes
Conscious physiological reactions include what the psychologist Nico Frijda
calls action readiness, as well as changes in facial expressions and internal bodily
systems. The following is how Deonna and Teroni describe conscious physical
reactions:
We should conceive of emotions as distinct types of bodily awareness,
where the subject experiences her body holistically as taking an attitude
towards a certain object. (Deonna and Teroni, 2012, 79)
Since the consciously felt physiological reaction consists of action readiness and the
changes of facial expressions and internal bodily system, that is why a conscious ly
felt physiological response is holistic. Action readiness is the conscious experience
that one feels one’s body as ready to take a particular kind of behavior. As Frijda
(1988, 351) writes, “subjects report impulses to approach or avoid, desires to shout
and sing or move, and the urge to retaliate, or on occasion, they report an absence
of desires to do anything or a lack of interest, or feeling of loss of control.” This
observation provides the basis for the idea that action readiness at least partly
constitutes emotions. While experiencing anger, one consciously feels one’s body as
ready to retaliate. While experiencing fear, one consciously experiences one’s body
as poised to escape from or eliminate the threat. While experiencing shame, one
consciously feels one’s body as prepared to hide oneself from other’s eyes (Smith,
2014, 100).
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Furthermore, Frijda (1988, 351) suggests that different kinds of action
readiness can clearly differentiate distinct kinds of emotions. For instance, to have
joy is to feel one’s body as ready to cheer and approach an object; to be angry is to
feel one’s body as poised to remove or harm the object; to have shame is to have
feel one’s body as prepared to hide or cover ourselves.
Note that it is not the case that having an emotion is always having an
interaction with an object directly. As Frijda writes:
Joy, for instance, is a sense of pleasure plus the urge toward exuberance and
contact-seeking. Anger is a sense of displeasure plus the urge to do some of
the things that remove or harm its agent. Shame is a sense of displeasure
plus the compelling desire to disappear from view. Sadness is a sense of
displeasure plus the ebbing away of any urge except for the desire for the
lost object or opportunity, which is known to be unfulfillable. Frijda (1988,
351)
Sometimes while experiencing an emotion, action readiness can be manifested in a
way without having direct interaction with the object or event. For instance, while
experiencing joy, I can celebrate because of an object, but my celebration can be
manifested in a way without contacting the object directly, such as going to a bar
for a drink with my friends.
It needs to be clarified that if one has a consciously felt physiological
reaction, then one feels one’s body as ready to do something, but not vice versa.
We can feel our bodies as poised to harm or remove an object or engage in an
event without anger, and we can feel our bodies as prepared to hide while playing
hide-and-go-seek with my sister without shame. Action readiness is part of a
physiological reaction but is not a sufficient condition for having a physiological
response which are necessary to an emotion.
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Different physiological responses may sometimes overlap, which means that
the reaction may share the same kind of action readiness. For example, while
experiencing intense anger and sadness, it is likely the case that one feels one's
body as ready to get rid of the object that spurs one’s emotions. But it does not
mean that anger and sadness are the same emotion because the readiness to take a
particular kind of action is merely a part of the physiological reaction. An emotion as
a consciously felt physiological response is more than the readiness to perform a
particular type of behavior. Although physiological response consists of action
readiness, it also includes the changes of facial expressions (Frijda, 1988, 351). And
as Deonna (2014, PowerPoint) mentions, a physiological reaction also consists of
the changes in the autonomic nervous system and endocrine system. In other
words, an emotion as a complete physiological response consists of action
readiness and the changes of facial expressions, the autonomic nervous system, and
endocrine system. Sadness and anger can be differentiated because they are
distinct as a holistic consciously felt physiological reaction.
Some might object that we can experience emotion without action
readiness, which means that action readiness is not a necessary condition for
emotions. For example, one can fear a dog without being disposed to escape from
or eliminate the dog. This objection can be explained away, however. If one has an
emotion without exhibiting a particular kind of action readiness, the problem could
lie in one’s knowledge rather than action readiness. That is to say that one lacks the
knowledge of how to respond to a particular kind of objects or events. Thus one
cannot exhibit a particular kind of action readiness. As Frijda (1988, 351) mentions,
it can be the case that our body is ready for action without knowing which action.
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Instead, if one has the knowledge of how to respond to a particular kind of object or
event, then while experiencing an emotion, one will possess the corresponding
action readiness. Imagine a child who has never been taught how to deal with an
aggressive dog. If unfortunately, the child is facing a dog, she cannot exhibit the
corresponding action readiness because she has never been taught how to escape
from or eliminate the dog. If she knows how to do so, she will have the disposition
to escape from or even eradicate the dog as a threat.
Since the bodily attitudinal theory holds that emotions are consciously felt
bodily attitude, the second kind of importance of emotions, namely, how to make
us sensitive to the values of objects and thus make implicit value evaluations.
Although one might not be able to access to why properties other than values give
us a reason to have emotions towards objects, given the environments in question
are so complex, consciously felt bodily attitudes make one aware of the values and
thus make implicit evaluations. The bodily attitudes make us aware of them simply
because the attitudes are consciously felt. And such implicit evaluations should be
understood as behavioral reactions towards the objects. Looking back to the
firefighter story, he was not able to access to the properties other than
dangerousness that give him a reason to fear the building since the environment
was so chaotic and dramatic. Yet he had felt that something was wrong without
knowing why, and thus commanded his subordinates to leave the building. What he
firefighter did can be explained by that he had a consciously felt attitude towards
the building, and thus aware of the dangerousness of the building, then he made an
implicit evaluation, namely, leaving the building.
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The notion of action readiness is crucial to explain the third kind of
importance of emotions, namely, how emotions motivate one to act morally.
Emotions are motivating because they contain particular kinds of action readiness.
If one judges that it is morally wrong to take an action, then one appropriately has a
negative emotion towards the behavior, and with actually having the negative
emotions, one is also motivated to act morally. A negative emotion includes adverse
action readiness. By “negative” I mean stopping and preventing any further
interaction or happening related to the object. We usually see anger and sadness as
negative emotions. If one experiences anger, then one feels one’s body as ready to
retaliate, and retaliation prevents the further provocation given by the related
object. If one experiences sadness, then one feels one’s body as poised to evade the
object, and evading stop one’s interaction with the happening. Putting all the things
together, if one judges that it is morally wrong to take an action, then one
appropriately has a negative emotion towards the behavior, and with actually
having the negative emotion, which means one has the behavioral disposition to
cease and prevent any further interaction or happening related to the behavior.
In summary, the bodily attitudinal theory holds that emotions are
consciously felt physiological reactions that include action readiness and the
changes of facial expressions and internal bodily systems. Being ready to take a
particular kind of behavior does not mean always interacting with an object directly.
Although having an emotion-constituting physiological reaction entails being
prepared to perform a particular kind of behavior, being poised to carry out some
action is insufficient for having a consciously felt physiological response. Some
emotions share the same readiness to take a particular kind of behavior, but they
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are different because they have a distinct combination of the changes of facial
expressions and internal bodily systems. While having a conscious physiological
reaction, one’s body may exhibit no action readiness since one does not know what
action to take. If one’s body is ready to take some action and one knows what to do,
then action readiness is exhibited.
2.1.2. Attitudes and Evaluation
Having clarified what it means for emotions to be consciously felt bodily
attitudes, I shall explain the second claim. The relation between an attitude and its
content needs to be introduced and explained because the relation is crucial to
illustrate why we should favor the bodily attitudinal theory over rivals such as the
judgmental and the perceptual theories of emotions.
We can start by considering familiar propositional attitudes. These attitudes
are helpful to illustrate the difference between an attitude and its content.
Examples of propositional attitudes include believing that snow is white, hoping
that Mt Rosea is twelve miles high, and so forth (Oppy, n.d., introduction). The
attitudes, such as believing and hoping, are different from their contents snow is
white and Mt Rosea is twelve miles high. Attitudes are evaluations of the content,
which means that to have an attitude towards the content is to evaluate the
content in a certain way. In the case of belief, when I believe that snow is white, I
have an attitude believing (considering as true) towards the content snow is white,
which means that I evaluate the content as true. Similarly, in the case of emotion,
when I fear the dog, I have an attitude of fear (considering as dangerous) towards
the content the dog, which means that I evaluate the dog as dangerous.
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We need to clarify, in what sense beliefs and emotions are evaluations
towards their contents. In one mistaken understanding, beliefs are evaluations
because truth is a part of the content. In other words, when I believe that snow is
white, I have the content that it is true that snow is white. This sense is mistaken
because the view entails that no creatures would be able to form beliefs without
the concept of truth. Call this the content view. Instead, beliefs are evaluations in
the sense that truth is the formal object of belief, a standard that decides whether
the attitude of believing is correct, but is not a part of the content. The attitude
believing towards the content snow is white is correct if and only if snow is white.
Call this the formal object view.
Similarly, one could hold that emotions are evaluations because values are a
part of the content. When I fear the dog, I have an emotional attitude towards the
dog that is an evaluation because dangerousness is a part of the content the dog.
Instead, on the formal object view, emotions are evaluations because values are the
formal objects of these emotions, standards that determine whether the attitudes
are correct. The attitude of fear towards the content the dog is correct if and only if
the dog is dangerous, but dangerousness is not part of the content of the fear.
As the difference between the content view and the formal object view has
been clarified, we need to choose one. I shall explain why we should be in favor of
the formal object view but not the content view.
According to the content view, to have emotional attitudes towards
contents is to evaluate the contents in the sense that values are a part of the
content. One version of this view holds that we judge that the contents have certain
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values. The judgmental theory holds that value judgments are necessary for having
emotions, which means that the value judgment is a necessary part of the emotion
(Deigh, 2010, 25). For instance, the judgment that the dog is dangerous is necessary
having the fear of the dog. The judgment that the man is offensive is necessary for
having the anger at the man. An emotion cannot exist without the corresponding
value judgment. Fear of the dog cannot exist without the judgment of
dangerousness, and anger at the man cannot exist without the judgment of
offensiveness. Nonetheless, it does not mean that having a value judgment entails
having an emotion since it is possible to have a value judgment without an emotion
unless the emotion and the value judgment are identical.
A major objection to the judgmental theory is the problem of the
recalcitrant emotions. Sometimes one has emotions without the corresponding
value judgments; sometimes one has emotions that are contrary to one’s value
judgments. It follows that value judgments are neither necessary nor sufficient for
having emotional responses (D’Arms and Jacobson, 2003, 129). To illustrate, it is
possible to fear a dog even while one judges that the dog is not dangerous, and one
can fail to fear what one judges to be dangerous.
A simple way to defend the judgmental theory is to say that the fearful
person judges that the dog is dangerous but at the same time judges that the dog is
not dangerous. In other words, she holds contradictory judgments, and thus
experiences a recalcitrant emotion. Nonetheless, it is implausible to the claim that
we have a rebellious emotion because of the conflicting judgments. The defenders
of the judgmental theory must provide evidence for the claim that we have
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conflicting judgments while experiencing a rebellious emotion. Otherwise, it is
merely an ad hoc hypothesis. It is unconvincing to accept ad hoc explanations since
they weaken the testability of theories, which means that ad hoc hypotheses make
theories unable to be confirmed or falsified. 1 Another further objection towards the
straight reply is that we usually experience recalcitrant emotions whereas we
seldom have contradictory judgments, which means that both kinds of states are
asymmetric in terms of frequency. The judgmental theory, therefore, remains
unappealing.
Some scholars, such as Greenspan, offer a modification of the judgmental
theory, suggesting that emotions are “perceptions” of values (D’Arms and Jacobson,
2003, 130). To have an emotional attitude is to perceive the content as having a
particular value. To have the attitude fear towards the content the dog is to
perceive that the dog is dangerous. This view is called the perceptual theory. Please
note that it does not mean that when one has an emotional attitude one literally
perceives the evaluative content. It should be understood as a quasi-perceptual
state. Quasi-perceptions are similar to visual and audio perceptions like looking at a
red cube and listening to a banging sound, because both quasi-perceptions and
perceptions share some similarities such as incorrigibility and having vivid
phenomenology (Baker, 2014, 1). Since emotions as quasi-perceptions are relatively
incorrigible, the recalcitrance of emotions is explained. Imagine that one perceives a
big pink rabbit in front of the door, and everyone says that there is in fact no such

1

Suppose an astrophysicist’s theory predicts that there is a planet running around the sun in our solar
system. Yet, via our finest and most sophisticated telescopes, we observe no planet there. The
astrophysicist then adds an ad hoc hypothesis to protect her theory: the planet is invisible, so we cannot
see it via our finest telescopes. The ad hoc hypothesis makes the theory less testable even not testable at
all. if visual observation were the only possible test.
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rabbit at all. Then one has a reason for believing that one’s perception of the big
pink rabbit is an illusion, but the illusion can remain even if one makes a judgment
that is contradictory to the illusion.
Still, it is implausible to accept the perceptual theory. According to Baker
(2014, 5) and Schroeder (2008, 122), perceptual theories of desire roughly are the
views that to desire something is to quasi-perceive it as good. This kind of accounts
face an objection: they are incompatible with the fact that infants and animals have
desires because quasi-perceiving something as good requires the concept of good.
Applying this objection to the perceptual theory of emotions , the concepts of values
are needed to have quasi-perceptions of values. Perhaps some argue that infants
and animals do not need the concepts of values to have perceptions of evaluative
properties. Although it is acceptable to say that children and animals have simple
concepts like the concepts of a red cube and a pink rabbit, it seems improper to say
that they have the concepts of value since they are more complicated than those
simple concepts. The concepts of values are more complicated in a way that they
are too abstract for them to handle. The concept of a red cube and a pink rabbit is
not abstract because infants and animals can know what they are by seeing a red
cube and a pink rabbit. But the concepts of values such as wrongness are too
abstract to them. To know what wrongness is, they need to know what harm and
deception and other actions that we consider as wrong are.
This problem is welcome news for my project: the perceptual theory is not a
good partner to neo-sentimentalism because together they face a circularity
problem. As D’Arms and Jacobson (2003, 127) write, “…the sentiments adduced to
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explicate moral concepts already involve the very content they are supposed to
explain.” Neo-sentimentalists attempt to analyze the moral concepts in moral
judgments in terms of appropriate emotional responses, and the perceptual
theorists want to explain emotions in terms of quasi-perceptions of evaluative
properties. But now we need to introduce the concepts of values to have the quasiperceptions of values, which mean that the perceptual theorists use something that
neo-sentimentalists attempt to explain to explain what emotions are.
In summary, according to the content view, to have emotional attitudes
towards the content is to evaluate the content in the sense that values are a part of
the content. In other words, emotions consist of value judgments or quasiperceivings. The judgmental theory should be rejected because of the problem of
recalcitrant emotions. The perceptual theory fares better on this score, but it is
incompatible with the fact that infants and animals have emotions. This is welcome
news for sentimentalists about moral judgment, as sentimentalism cannot be
combined with either of these theories without circularity.
Does the bodily attitudinal theory face the problem of circularity as well?
Some might think that the bodily attitudinal theory faces the same problem
because concepts of values are needed to have consciously felt physiological
reactions. I do not believe so. The bodily attitudinal theorists analyze emotional
attitudes in terms of conscious physiological responses, and having these reactions
requires no concepts of values; thus, the theory does not exclude the fact that
infants and animals have emotions. Also, the bodily attitudinal theory does not
result in circularity when combined with neo-sentimentalism, because the concepts
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of values are analyzed in terms of appropriate emotional responses, and the
emotional responses are further analyzed as instances of physiological reactions.
2.2 Justifying Emotions and Value Judgments
This is Deonna and Teroni’s account of when emotions are justified:
An emotion is justified if, and only if, in the situation in which the subject
finds herself, the properties she is (or seems to be) aware of and on which
her emotion is based constitute (or would constitute) an exemplification of
the evaluative property that features in the correctness conditions of the
emotions she undergoes.
(Deonna and Teroni, 2012, 97)
My fear of a dog is justified if and only if my fear is (or seems to be) based on my
awareness that the dog has the relevant non-evaluative properties, such its sharp
teeth, claws, and impulsive behavior that constitute (or would constitute)
dangerousness. Introducing the phrase “would constitute” is required because
whether the non-evaluative properties constituted the values depends on who one
is and what the situation is. If one is Ironman, then the non-evaluative properties
probably do not constitute dangerousness since one is wearing a super armor.
However, if one is just an ordinary person without protection, then the nonevaluative properties probably constitute dangerousness. The word “would” merely
means that it is not the case that the non-evaluative properties constitute the
evaluative properties to all subjects in all circumstances. Seeming roughly means
that we think something in the way it is default. I shall explain what seeming means
with phenomena conservativism below.
Also, Deonna and Teroni believe that a justified emotion is sufficient to
justify the corresponding value judgment. If one is (or seems to be) aware of the
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non-evaluative features possessed by the particular object which constitutes (or
would constitute) the relevant evaluative property, then one’s emotion is justified.
With the justified emotion, if one has no reason to reject the seeming, then one is
also prima facie justified in believing the corresponding value judgment. If one is or
seems to be aware of that the non-evaluative properties of the dog which would
constitute dangerousness, then one is justified to have a fear of the dog. And if one
has no reason to refuse the seeming, then one is prima facie justified to believe that
the dog is dangerous. The phrase “prima facie” is needed because a seeming is not
a decisive justification for emotion because the seeming does not exclude other
possibilities.
Huemer’s (2005, 99) phenomenal conservativism can be used to help
illustrate Deonna and Teroni’s account. According to Huemer (n.d., section, 1a), if it
seems to subject S that P and there is no reason or evidence against P, then S is to
some extent justified in believing P. The meaning of the phrase “it seems to subject
S that P” should be understood broadly. It can mean perceptual, intellectual,
memorial, introspective appearances. If it appears to be that the sky is blue, and
there is no reason or evidence against this seeming, then I am justified in believing
that the sky is blue. Furthermore, an appearance is defeated if the appearance does
not match reality since the appearance could be hallucinations or false memories
and so forth. As Huemer writes:
Appearances sometimes fail to correspond to reality, as in the case of
illusions, hallucinations, false memories, and mistaken intuitions. Most
philosophers agree that logically, this could happen across the board – that
is, the world as a whole could be radically different from the way it appears.
These observations do not conflict with phenomenal conservatism.
Phenomenal conservatives do not hold that appearances are an infallible
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source of information, or even that they are guaranteed to be generally
reliable. Phenomenal conservatives simply hold that to assume things are
the way they appear is a rational default position, which one should
maintain unless and until grounds for doubt (“defeaters”) appear. (Huemer,
n.d., section 1b)
Applying phenomenal conservativism to Deonna and Teroni’s account, if it seems to
one that the non-evaluative properties that would constitute the value is present,
and one has no reason for refusing the seeming, then one is prima facie justified in
believing the corresponding value judgment. The idea is that the justified emotion
entails that it seems that a particular object possesses the non-evaluative property
that would constitute the value. In other words, a justified emotion is a defeasible
justification for the value judgment. If an emotion is unjustified, then we have no
reason to believe that the particular object possesses the non-evaluative properties
that would constitute the value, then it is also unjustified to believe the value
judgment.
2.3 Bodily Attitudes and the Teleological Theory of Representation
When experiencing an emotion, one feels the changes of one’s facial
expression, muscular movements, and the internal bodily systems. For example,
while experiencing anger, one feels that one’s face and muscles are in tension, the
increase in one’s heart rate and breathing and so forth. The psychologist William
James believes that these bodily phenomena are emotions. Moreover, these bodily
phenomena are not the results of emotions but emotions themselves. As James
writes:
My thesis, on the contrary, is that the bodily changes follow directly the
perception of the exciting fact and that our feeling of the same changes as
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they occur is the emotion. James (1884, 189)
The meaning of perception here is different from the meaning of quasi-perception
in the perceptual theory of emotions mentioned previously. In James’s theory,
perceptions literally mean bodily sensations. To support this theory, James
introduces a thought-experiment:
I now proceed to urge the vital point of my whole theory, which is this. If we
fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our consciousness
of it all the feelings of its characteristic bodily symptoms, we find we have
nothing left behind, no "mind-stuff" out of which the emotion can be
constituted, and that a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception is all
that remains. (James, 1884, 189)
James’s theory has one selling point, that is, the theory is not cognitively demanding
and thus, unlike the judgmental and perceptual approaches, it does not exclude the
fact that infants and animals have emotions (Deonna and Teroni, 2012, 64).
However, the theory has a serious flaw which is that it fails to explain the
intentionality of emotions. Understanding emotions only as the changes of the
bodily perceptions is incompatible with our daily speaking of emotions, such as “I
am angry at John” and “She is sad because the cat is dead.” Emotions must be
about something, and the theory does not mention the link between emotions and
the objects that they are directed at.
The bodily attitudinal theory, however, preserves the intentionality of
emotions, as its central thesis is that every emotion consists of a consciously felt
physiological reaction that is directed at an object or event. But what makes the
conscious physiological responses directed at something? We need a theory of
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intentionality to illustrate the link between emotions and the objects that they are
directed at in the bodily attitudinal theory.
We believe that our mental states represent something in the world. But
why are they about something? What is the representational relation between the
mental states and the world (Peters, 2014, 273; Millikan, 2003, 3)? Applying the
question to the intentionality of bodily attitudes, why are they directed at contents
or objects? What determines bodily attitudes directed at contents or objects? We
need to introduce to a theory of representation as a complete theory of emotions is
required to explain the intentionality of emotions. A plausible theory of
representation is the teleological theory of mental content. This theory holds that a
mental state represents something because of its biological function to indicate the
object in question. I believe that this approach is suitable for explaining the
intentionality of the emotions, since some believe that emotions are evolutionary
products (Johnson, n.d., section 2), and the teleological theory also explains the
representation of mental states in terms of evolution.
The teleological theory of mental content holds that a mental state in a
creature represents an object if and only if the mental state is biologically selected
to perform the function of detecting the object (Peters, 2014, 274). The concept of
the dog represents dogs because the concept has the biologically selected function
indicate dogs. It is just like that a thermometer represents the temperature because
it has the designed function of detecting the temperature. The biological function of
indicating dogs exists because the concept was selected to detect dogs and develop
advantageous behavior for responding to dogs. Evolution shapes the selection over
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a period, or by learning or conditioning during the lifetime of a creature. Applying
this theory to bodily attitudes, such attitudes are directed at their contents or
objects because they have their biological functions of indicating the content or
objects, and evolution or learning shape the biological functions. Evolution develops
our bodily attitudes so we are more likely to survive in hazardous environments and
more social in cultivation. And to develop bodily attitudes by learning is helpful to
achieve particular purposes. For instance, a boxer needs to learn to be angry at his
opponent to win the competition.
The teleological theory is an “externalist” theory, which means the mental
content is not determined by anything such as memory and seeming, in one’s mind
consciously, but determined by what one encountered in the past. As Millikan
writes:
Thus naturalistic teleological theories are "externalist" theories of mental
content. They imply that the content of one's thought is not determined by
anything before one's mind or within one's consciousness or even within
one's head. Just as actually remembering something, rather than merely
seeming to remember it, does not happen wholly within one's present head
but requires that one has previously encountered that thing, thoughts that
are about something actual also require the right sort of history. It would be
possible for a teleologist to avoid this externalism only with a non-historical
and also non-environment-relative account of the nature of biological
functions. (Millikan, 2003, 5)
A major objection towards the teleological theory of mental content is the swampman objection. If the teleological theory is true, then the representation of a mental
state in a creature is determined by its biological function, which is selected for by
evolution, learning or conditioning. However, we can imagine that the mental states
in a creature represent something, yet their functions are not determined by
evolutionary selection or learning (Peters, 2014, 275). Davidson (1987, 443)
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mentions the following thought-experiment: suppose that Davidson is walking
nearby a swamp and suddenly gets stuck by lighting. The lighting totally destroys
Davidson, meanwhile coincidentally the materials from the swamp perfectly
reassemble into a replica of Davidson at the molecular level. The replica of Davidson
is behaviorally identical with Davidson, which means that the replica talks, walks,
and writes like Davidson. Since the replica is made of the materials of the swamp,
he is called “the swamp-man.” We tend to think that the mental states of the
swamp-man are representational. But the mental states were not selected for, nor
are they the result of learning.
There are two responses to the swamp-man objection. Some teleological
theorists deny that the swamp-man has representational states (Neander, 2006,
385; Millikan 1996, 7). Other teleological theorists deny that the swamp-man is
insufficient to falsify the teleological theory because the swamp-man is not a
creature in reality since the teleological theory is only about real creatures (Peters,
2014, 276).
To explain why bodily attitudes are directed at objects or contents, and why
fear is directed at the dog, the teleological theory is a possible move. Bodily
attitudes are directed at their objects or content because they have their biological
function of detecting the objects and contents, and their selection history designs
the function to develop appropriate evolutionary behavior for the species’
flourishment. Perhaps, more specifically, emotions are biologically designed in
order to promote pro-social behavior in civilized societies (Prinz, 2007, 80).
2.4 Objections towards the Bodily Attitudinal Theory of Emotions
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2.4.1 Joel Smith’s First Objection and Reply
Since the bodily attitudinal theory holds that consciously felt physiological
reactions are necessary for having emotions, the proponents of the theory need to
explain why there are some patients who have a rich emotional life, although
lacking the abilities to feel bodily sensations and perform muscular movements
(Smith, 2014, 101). A contemporary bodily theorist of emotions, Damasio (2006,
155), suggests that there is a device called “as-if loop” within the brain This device
simulates the changes in the bodily feelings in cases which veridical bodily feelings
are no longer available.
We can reasonably assume that the “as-if loop” device is Deonna and
Teroni’s default defense. Nevertheless, it seems that the “as-if loop” device cannot
help defend the bodily attitudinal theory because Deonna and Teroni claim that
emotions are essentially felt, yet Damasio explicitly refers to the three following
states:
A state of emotion, which can be triggered and executed unconsciously; a
state of feeling which can be represented non-consciously; and a state of
feeling made conscious, i.e. known to the organism having both emotions
and feelings. (Damasio, 2000, 37)
Since Deonna and Teroni claim that emotions are essentially felt and the “as -if loop”
device simulates bodily feelings unconsciously, it is unclear how they could use the
device as a reply to this objection, and thus they accept both of the following
statements, which creates a tension without a solution (Smith, 2014, 102):
(a) Conscious emotion can persist in patients without any bodily feeling,
veridical or otherwise.
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(b) Emotional phenomena are bodily phenomena.
To reply to this objection, I will reject (a) and preserve (b). I believe that besides the
“as-if” device phantom limbs sensation and phantom pain open another possibility
for the bodily attitudinal theory.
Phantom limb sensations are common phenomena among a variety of
individuals (Giummarra et al., 2007, 220). At least 98% of the patients experience
phantom limbs after amputation, nerve damage, or spinal cord damage, and
approximately one-fifth of children with inborn limb aplasia experience the
phantoms as well. 80% of patients who had a limb removed reported that they
experienced various kinds of phantom pain, including burning, tingling, throbbing
and so forth. Some patients report that they have phantom sensations immediately
after amputation, whereas some report that the sensations emerge years later.
Phantom sensations may be the sensations of limbs such as arms, legs, breasts, and
even internal organs. Phantom limbs are described as occupying space, which
means that it feels like they have sizes, sharps, and postures, and patients claim
that they can control the phantom limbs.
Phantom limbs sensations can be perceived normally or abnormally
(Giummarra et al., 2007, 221). Some patients report that they can move their
phantom limbs within a limited range whereas some claim that they can move the
limbs to anatomically impossible positions. Patients who suffered from spinal cord
damage tell that they perceive phantom limbs sensation in their lower body
unrealistically, such as feeling “like the toes are all turned down under the bottom
of the foot.”
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In the past, it was speculated that phantom limbs sensations are caused by
the neuromas at the tip of stumps. However, this theory is insufficient to explain
the sensations, since people who suffer from inherent limb deficiency sometimes
feel phantom limbs as well. This suggests that there is a central representation of
the limbs in the brain (Ramachandran and Hirstein, 1998, 1604).
Another theory, which explains the central representation, is called “the
neuro-matrix theory” (Giummarra et al., 2007, 224). This theory holds that the
attentions and the perceptions of the body are caused by configured activities
based on the neuro-signatures inside of the brain. Neuro-signatures can be
generated by a variety of causes, such as somatic inputs, visual inputs, and even the
changes of the immune system. Although the neuro-matrix created by different
inputs, the removal of limbs and the losses of other kinds of biological inputs can
lead to a cortical reorganization, and the outburst of the activities of the neuromatrix produce configured activities similar to the activity associated with pain and
eventually cause conscious phantom pain. Whilst the neuro-matrix theory can
explain that some phantom pain is caused by sources other than injury, lesion and
the losses of limbs, the theory is difficult to test empirically (Giummarra et al., 2007,
224). The theory is unable to explain why phantom limb pain cannot be weakened
by the disappearance and the spontaneous termination of phantom limb sensation,
and why some patients do not feel phantom limb pain after amputation (Bittar et al.,
2005, 401).
Although the fact that there is not yet a satisfactory theory which explains
the nature of phantom limb pain and phantom limb sensations, these phantom
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states are wide-spread phenomena. It is possible that patients with spinal damage
experience “phantom emotions.” By “phantom emotions” I mean that while those
patients are reporting that they experience conscious emotions, they may be
feeling the changes of the phantom sensations of their internal organs and the
muscular movement that are longer physically linked to their brain. Given the
majority of amputees and people who suffer from congenital limb deficiency
experience phantom limb pain and phantom limb sensation, “phantom emotions”
could well be a usual phenomenon. Thus, we can preserve the central thesis of (BAT)
while explaining those patients with complete spinal cord damage. However, I have
to make it clear that this is only a possibility because such speculation is not
empirically verified and further investigation on the relations between phantom
limb sensations and “phantom emotions” is needed.

2.4.2 Joel Smith’s Second Objection and Reply
This second objection is about the correctness condition in the bodily
attitudinal theory. Deonna and Teroni’s account of the correctness condition is as
follows:
Fear of the dog is an experience of the dog as dangerous because it consists
in feeling the body’s readiness to act so as to diminish the dog’s likely impact
on it (flight, preemptive attack, etc.), and this felt attitude is correct if and
only if the dog is dangerous. (Deonna and Teroni, 2012, 81)
While it is natural to say that it is correct to run if and only if the dog is dangerous,
the meaning of correctness needs to be clarified further. What is meant by “ correct”

66

in this context? Surely being correct cannot mean being true because action
readiness cannot be true or false.
The following examples provided by Deonna and Teroni themselves vividly
illustrate the seriousness of this problem: anger is the experience that one feels that
one’s body is ready to retaliate, and this anger is correct if and only if another
person is offensive to one. But Jesus disagrees with such a saying as it is written in
the Bible: if anyone strikes you on the right cheek, turn the other so (Matthew 5:39).
It seems that you ought to agree with Jesus if you are a Christian.
Another way to clarify the meaning of correctness is to say that being
correct means being rational, yet this can also be questioned: is it rational to
execute retaliation if a person is offensive to you? In the spirit of G.E. Moore, if
being correct is synonymous with being rational in this context, then we would not
say no to the above question since it would be self-contradictory. Smith (2014, 104),
as Deonna and Teroni (2012, 7) mention, suggests that the seriousness of this
problem lies in differentiating emotional appropriateness, prudential
appropriateness, and moral appropriateness.
I have already replied to this objection before in section 1. Since I propose
that being correct means being appropriate to have an emotion, which means that
one has a right reason to have the emotion, I shall not investigate this objection
further. I wonder why this section is even necessary given that it goes nowhere and
ends up depending on what was said in section 1.
2.4.3 Joel Smith’s Third Objection and Reply
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The third objection is that it is unclear how the awareness of the nonevaluative content in one’s cognitive base justifies the corresponding evaluative
attitude (Smith, 2014, 104). It is difficult to tell how the awareness of the impulsive
behavior, the shape of the teeth, and claws possessed by a dog justifies the fear of
the dog. Unless we have further information that a particular kind of non-evaluative
properties is identified with a particular kind of evaluative property, it is implausible
to think that the justification for emotions can travel via the content.
The straightest way of replying to this objection is to claim that a particular
kind of non-evaluative property is identical with a particular kind of evaluative
property, and thus, the non-evaluative content can justify the evaluative attitude.
However, I shall argue that the identity relation cannot be proven empirically
because the inference to the best explanation can prove the claim that water is H 2O
whereas we cannot prove the claim that the non-evaluative properties are identical
with the evaluative properties. The claim that water is H 2O can be proven by the
inference to the best explanation because the claim possesses some explanatory
power. Here is an observable fact:
If we submit a sample of water to electrolysis, then hydrogen will be formed
at the cathode and bubbles of oxygen will form at the anode. The mass of
water decreases by the same amount that the mass of hydrogen and oxygen
increase. Two moles of hydrogen are formed for every one mole of oxygen.
(Huemer, 2005, 89)
Base on the observable fact, we can make the scientific hypothesis that water is
H2O because the hypothesis causally and counter-factually explains the observable
fact. The causal explanation is that water is constituted by hydrogen and oxygen,
and it is the only causal explanation to the fact. The counter-factual explanation is
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that the fact would not happen if water were not identical with H 2O, and no other
counter-factual explanation can explain the fact equally well.
However, the claim the non-evaluative properties are identical with
evaluative properties cannot be proven by the inference to the best explanation.
Assume that John kills many people, and we make the moral hypothesis that John is
immoral. The moral hypothesis possesses no explanatory power since it cannot
causally or counter-factually explain why John kills many people. The moral
hypothesis cannot causally explain that because we can explain that John kills many
people without using any moral terms (Huemer, 2005, 90). The moral hypothesis
cannot counter-factually explain the fact because we can explain the fact equally
well with a psychological story (Huemer, 2005, 90). For instance, a psychologist can
say that if John’s parents had not neglected him, then he would not have killed
anyone.
Another less ambitious strategy is to claim that the particular kind of
evaluative properties supervenes on the particular kind of non-evaluative
properties, which means that if the non-evaluative properties change, then the
evaluative properties change. Although the evaluative properties supervene on the
non-evaluative properties, they are not identical with each other. The evaluative
properties supervene on the non-evaluative properties because the non-evaluative
properties exhaustively constitute the evaluative properties (Shafer-Laudan, 2003,
76). Imagine there is a lead statue. The piece of lead exhaustively constitutes the
statute, yet they are not identical with each other since the piece of lead would
remain even if the statute is destroyed. Since the non-evaluative properties
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exhaustively constitute the evaluative properties, the non-evaluative properties can
justify the evaluative attitudes.
Even if the supervenience strategy is also untenable, there is still a way of
defending the justificatory account of the bodily attitudinal theory. It is unnecessary
to justify the evaluative attitude via the awareness of the non-evaluative content,
which means that one can bypass such awareness to justify the attitude. Deonna
and Teroni seem to assume epistemic internalism in this picture, yet I think that
epistemic externalism opens another possibility to justify the attitude. Briefly,
epistemic internalism requires that one is able to cognitively get access to the
justification for beliefs, whereas epistemic externalism holds that one does not
need to cognitively get access to the justification, and allows the justification to be
grounded outside one's cognition (Bonjour, 2002, 234; Poston, n.d., introduction).
An argument against epistemic internalism and for externalism is that
unsophisticated epistemic subjects cannot have internalist justification (Bonjour,
2002, 242). These subjects include higher animals, young children, and cognitively
unsophisticated adults. Higher animals can understand a wide variation of
commands, to have desires, emotions, and even beliefs, it is unclear that they are
sophisticated enough to have reasons for their beliefs. If an argument is markedly
complicated, requiring one to divide the argument into many parts and know a lot
of technical terms, then young children and some elderly people cannot cognitively
understand the argument and thus have internalist justification. Furthermore, the
chicken-sexers are experts who are capable of distinguishing between male and
female chickens. It is reported they are unable to describe how to do the distinction,

70

yet they can sort chickens and believe that this is a male and this is a female. Since
we tend to think that higher animals, young children, elder people and chickensexers have knowledge to a certain extent, it is either the case that knowledge does
not require justification or that justification is not internal (Poston, n.d., section 3b).
If there are cases that people have knowledge without internal justification, then
analogously it seems plausible to believe that one can be justified to have the
evaluative attitudes without internal awareness of the non-evaluative content in
one’s cognitive base.
One famous version of externalism is Goldman’s Process reliabilism. This
theory holds that a belief is justified if and only if the belief is formed by a reliable
belief-making process (Goldman, 1979, 97). A belief-making process is a process
that takes certain inputs such as visual experience and transforms them into certain
outputs such as beliefs. A reliable belief-making process is a process that tends to
produce true beliefs. Perceptions and memory are reliable belief-forming processes
because they tend to produce true beliefs in most of the cases that they are applied,
whereas guessing and wishful thinking are unreliable processes because they tend
to produce false beliefs in most of the cases. By “tend” it means that justification is
a matter of degree. The more reliable a belief-making process is, the more justified
the belief produced by the process is. If I clearly remember that I ate noodles this
morning, then my belief that I ate noodles this morning is more justified, whereas if
I fuzzily remember that, then my belief is less justified.
Nevertheless, a reliable belief-forming process is neither sufficient nor
necessary for justifying a belief (Greco, 2002, 292). Suppose John has a rare sort of
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brain lesion which causes him to produce the belief that he has a brain lesion.
However, he has no evidence for it, and even has evidence against it, because he
has been given a medical analysis that claims that he is perfectly healthy by
qualified neurologists. We tend to think that his brain lesion is a reliable way to
form the belief, yet we do not think that he is justified to have the belief. This
demonstrates a reliable belief-forming process is not sufficient for justifying beliefs.
Assume that John is in a world full of massive deception created by a mighty demon.
In this world, everything is exactly the same as in the actual world. John can form
his beliefs by different processes like perceptions and memory. But we do not think
that he forms these beliefs reliably because of the massive deception, yet we tend
to think that he is justified to have the beliefs. Thus, a reliable belief-forming
process is not necessary for justifying beliefs.
To avoid the brain lesion case and the mighty demon case, we can adapt
Agent Reliabilism. This theory holds that a belief is B-justified (being justified for
beliefs) if and only if the belief is a product of one’s intellectual virtues as B-reliable
processes (processes that tend to produce true beliefs). There are at least two
understandings of intellectual virtues. Sosa understands intellectual virtues as
cognitive abilities such as perception, memory, and introspection, whereas
Montmarquet understands these virtues as personal traits such as intellectual
courage and intellectual carefulness (Greco, 2002, 293). Agent reliabilism is able to
explain the counter-examples to Goldman’s reliabilism. In the brain lesion case, the
belief caused by brain lesion is B-unjustified because it is not the outcome of one’s
intellectual virtues as B-reliable processes. In the mighty demon case, although one
is being massively deceived, one is B-justified to have the beliefs because they are
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the products of one’s intellectual virtues as B-reliable processes. A belief is Bjustified because the belief is the product of one’s intellectual virtue as B-reliable
processes. And one’s intellectual virtue as a reliable belief-forming process likely
produces true beliefs. Analogously, if an emotion is formed via one’s intellectual
virtue as E-reliable processes (processes that tend to produce correct emotions),
then the emotion is E-justified (being justified for emotions) since the intellectual
virtue as reliable emotion-forming processes tend to produce emotions which are
likely correct. If we have no reason for questioning the E-reliability of the emotionforming process, then the correspondent value judgment is B-justified as well.
A reason for justifying emotions in this way is that agent reliabilism can
explain the accountability of having emotions. We can hold people accountable for
having certain emotions (Prinz, 2007, 115). If one forms an emotion based on
unreliable emotion-making processes, we say that one’s emotion is not justified and
one is accountable for having the emotion. Instead, if one forms an emotion based
on one’s cognitive abilities like perceptions, we say that one’s emotion is E-justified
and one is praiseworthy for having the emotion. In this context, emotion-making
processes should be understood as cognitive abilities like perceptions but not
personal characteristics like carefulness since for example, it seems that carefulness
entails that one is making an emotion under the processes of system 2. In other
words, one is making an emotion under some kind of intentional control, and thus
my view is contradictory.
2.5 Moral emotions and Non-Moral Emotions
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Suppose two boxers are fighting against each other in a boxing competition.
Both of the boxers are angry at each other indeed, but they do not think that the
other is acting morally wrong. From this example, we can tell there is a distinction
between moral anger and non-moral anger, or in generally, there is a distinction
between moral emotions and non-moral emotions. This distinction is important for
justifying moral judgments as the boxing example tells that non-moral anger can be
appropriate even if it would not make sense to judge the target of such anger to be
morally wrong. The non-moral anger can justify the judgment that the person is
offensive. But being offensive is not always being morally wrong. Instead, we can
legitimately and naturally claim that the moral anger justifies the judgment that the
person is morally condemnable. To justify the judgment of wrongness, the anger
must be a moral anger. What makes an anger a moral anger?
The answer is ready to hand. As mentioned above, in the CAD model there
are three different sorts of emotions, including, contempt, anger, and disgust. The
violation of community norms causes contempt, the violation of autonomy norms
arises anger, and the violation of divinity norms in secular societies spurs disgust.
These norms not only can differentiate different kinds of negative emotions, and
are also able to distinguish moral emotions and non-moral emotions. The contempt
of the weakness of will in physical exercise is not a moral contempt because the
contempt is not directed at the violation of community norms. The anger at another
boxer is not a moral anger because the anger is not directed at the violation of
autonomy norms. The disgust directed at excrement is not a moral disgust because
the disgust is not direct at the violation of divinity norms. A negative emotion is a
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moral negative emotion if and only if the negative emotion is directed at the
violation of the norms in the CAD model.
Then the following question is: what makes the norms in the CAD model
moral norms? A simple answer is that moral emotions make the norms moral norms.
Another question is: what makes the emotions moral emotions? Another simple
answer is that the moral norms make the emotions moral emotions. The
mechanism is as follows:
Imagine that certain behaviors cause emotions that are not yet specific to
the moral domain. An act of cruelty might cause anger on the part of the
victim, and sympathy among others. The perpetrator may be ostracized,
criticized, and punished. This may cause the perpetrator to feel sad. If these
responses are stable, then cruelty is governed by a kind of rule. The rule
consists in the fact that cruelty is discouraged as a result of these emotional
responses. The emotions guarantee a predictable pattern of behavior.
Cruelty is less likely to occur, and when it does, certain emotions and
corresponding behaviors will follow. After this pattern is established, the
emotions that once had no moral significance take on new meaning.
Sadness is not just a generic loss-response, but a feeling associated with
violating a rule. Anger is not a generic response to a threat, but a feeling
directed at rule violators. Guilt and righteous anger are born. At the very
moment these emotions are born, the rule takes on new meaning. It is now
a rule enforced by moral emotions. It is a moral rule. (Prinz, 2007, 118)
Some might worry that the creation of moral norms and moral emotions would be
an example of vicious circularity (Prinz, 2007, 118). But I do not think that It is not a
vicious circularity because this circularity is different the circularities we deem
vicious. If we cannot explain A by B and then explain B by A because we believe that
there is an ultimate explanation for the case. We think that there must be an
explanation before other explanations. But we do not need to believe that there is a
priority between moral norms and moral emotions. It is not either the case that
moral norms precede moral emotions or that moral emotions precede moral norms
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because they mutually depend on each other. We do not ask which organ in our
body is more fundamental because the organs mutually rely on each other to keep
the body alive. The heart has the function of pumping blood, the liver has the role
of neutralizing toxins, the stomach has the function of digesting food, and so forth.
When all the organs are placed together, they have a new task: keeping the body
alive. The same goes for moral norms and moral emotions. Negative emotions have
the functions of preventing a certain kind of behavior, and the norms the functions
of guiding people to have a particular kind of negative emotions towards a certain
kind of behavior. When the norms and the negative emotions are placed together,
they have a new function: preventing people from violating the norms.

3 Concluding Remarks: Putting Things Together
Historically, sentimentalists understood moral judgments as the expressions
of sentiments towards actions, but such understanding leads us to the problem of
the recalcitrance of emotions. To avoid this difficulty, neo-sentimentalists
understand moral judgment as the judgments of an appropriate emotion without
actually having the emotion. The notion of being appropriate is analyzed in terms of
reasons of the right kind. At this point, neo-sentimentalists unify reason and
emotions in their framework. Meanwhile, in order to preserve the importance of
emotions, it is argued that emotions are a more cognitively economical way to
make moral evaluations. Emotions also make one sensitive to the values of the
objects in environments and motivate one to act morally.
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The bodily attitudinal theory of emotions illustrates how emotions bring one
the sensitivity and moral motivation. Emotions are consciously felt physiological
responses that consist of behavioral dispositions and other bodily phenomena.
Since bodily attitudes are consciously felt, one is aware of the values of the objects
in environments. Because emotions have behavioral dispositions, one is motivated
to act morally while having the emotion, and such dispositions are as well implicit
evaluations towards objects.
Neo-sentimentalism holds that to judge that an action is morally wrong is to
judge that it is appropriate to resent killing, which means that we have a right
reason to resent killing, without actually having the resentment. However, in order
to be more morally competent, one also needs the help of emotions to sense moral
values and to act morally.
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